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Executive Summary
The purpose of this study was to analyze whether state department of transportation
(DOT) organizational structures may influence or impact state transportation planning and
investment performance. To that end, this study reviewed the DOT organizational structures
of the 50 states, identified performance measures, and analyzed whether the existence of
organizational entities such as DOT boards and commissions may impact state DOT
performance. While most DOTs have a hierarchical structure—with the Governor appointing
the DOT Secretary or Director, who in turn manages a Department divided into operating
divisions, some states have established boards or commissions with policy and/or oversight
roles designed to provide policy guidance or greater transparency to DOT planning,
operations and performance.
The in-depth review of state DOT authorizing statutes and DOT organizational charts
revealed minimal differences in organizational structures among the states. However, 37
states have quasi-independent bodies such as commissions, boards or councils (hereinafter
referred to as commissions) that carry out various advisory and oversight functions. The
commissions perform many roles, including policy setting, budget review, performance
oversight, and project selection. The state DOT commissions typically give their states an
additional voice in policy and management decision making. They provide additional
accountability and transparency in policy making and performance. Consequently, the impact
of such bodies on DOTs is a useful venue for inquiry.
As shown in Table I, the most common role for a DOT commission is the
development of DOT policy (76%). Other common responsibilities were financial oversight
and project selection (60% and 65%, respectively). A smaller number of state commissions
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had responsibility for long-term and short-term planning and selection of DOT directors
(43%, 43% and 27%).

Table I: Attributes and Roles of State Transportation Commissions
Role or Attribute
Role in the development of DOT policy
Role in long term planning
Role in project selection
Role in financial oversight
Role in short term planning
Role in selecting the director of the DOT

Number
28
16
22
24
16
10

Percent
76%
43%
60%
65%
43%
27%

In pursuing the research question of whether the existence of a DOT commission
improved DOT performance, two indicators were selected for the performance comparison of
commission and non-commission states. The first indicator was the capital management
performance grade provided by the 2000 Government Performance Project, a study carried
out by the Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs at Syracuse University in
cooperation with Governing Magazine. State capital management grades were based on three
components, including (1) capital planning, (2) project management, and (3) asset
maintenance. As transportation infrastructure investment constitutes approximately 70% of
aggregate capital investment, the GPP scores for the states seemed a reasonable performance
measure for their DOTs. The second measure chosen for the performance comparison was
highway capital outlays per vehicle mile traveled. The study team felt that this performance
measure indicated the responsiveness of a state DOT transportation system needs.
The comparison of the commission and non-commission states found that the
commission states had higher Government Performance Project (GPP) scores than the noncommission states. States with commissions had average grades of 2.83 (on a 4 point scale),
while the non-commission states had average grades of 2.43.
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The study’s investigation of the impact of commissions on DOT performance also
utilized regression analysis. This involved regressing DOT performance – measured as the
GPP capital management grade – on explanatory variables including the presence of a
commission, characteristics and roles of the commission, and other state-specific variables
such as the size of the state highway system, and resource availability. Findings from the
regression analysis suggest that it is the presence of the commission, board, or council that
matters, not the commission’s specific roles or their characteristics.
The second phase of this study involved five case studies of high performing
commission states. The case studies were designed to identify potential reasons why the
commission states, based on these performance measures, performed at a higher level than the
non-commission states. In addition, the case studies sought insights regarding “best practices”
for state DOT commissions as well as other insights regarding policies and practices that
might enhance DOT performance and accountability.
Among the commission “best practice” guidelines garnered from the statistical
analysis and the case studies were the following:
1. Avoid geographical representation of commissioners
2. Avoid giving the commission the authority to nominate or select the DOT
Secretary or Director
3. Have a clear mission for the commission
4. Staff the commission with “citizens,” not elected officials
Interviews with various officials in the commission case study states provided the
following recommendations regarding commission powers, roles and responsibilities:
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1. The principal role of a commission should be policy formulation for the state
DOT.
2. The commission should be given oversight responsibility for performance
review.
3. The commission should be responsible for holding hearings in various regions
of the state to obtain citizen input into transportation policy and to improve the
transportation planning process.
4. The commission should serve as an advocate for transportation needs in the
state.
As noted, the case studies of the high performing states also sought to identify policies
and practices that may improve state DOT performance and accountability. Among the
observed “best practice” policies often pursued by the high performing case study states,
which could positively impact performance, were the following:
1. Improve performance and accountability in transportation system development
by reducing political involvement in project selection. For example, Ohio’s
commission has statutory authority to select new capacity projects. Such
authority permits the commission to consider emerging transportation needs
and trends without being pressured by the legislature or governor. In Florida,
the commission certifies that first three years of the five-year plan is fully
funded. Also, additions to the five year plan by legislative action require a
commensurate deletion of an equivalent project. This pay-as-you-go policy
discourages political or legislative meddling in the orderly management of
construction and maintenance activities. In Washington State, under their
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“Nickel Program,” project lists were developed regionally based on analytical
studies that included capacity and safety concerns. These lists (prioritized as A,
B, or C) were compiled by WSDOT professionals in the central office. The list
was then given to the commission and to the legislature for review and
comment. The only projects funded were those rated as A by all three parties.
2. Improve performance and accountability by holding statewide, regional and
local meetings regarding transportation plans to increase transparency and
trust. Maryland, for example, has its DOT planning staff tour the counties of
the state and meet with local officials to take suggestions for projects. The
commission in Washington holds monthly meetings in different locations to
garner input from public officials and citizens. Florida’s commission also holds
meetings on projects around the state. Such meetings encourage citizen and
community participation in the project selection and planning process and
render the project selection and planning processes more open and transparent.
3. Improve performance and accountability by empowering district offices to
make decisions regarding system maintenance and preservation. All five case
study states (Florida, Ohio, Maryland, Minnesota, and Washington) have
districts rank and select maintenance projects for inclusion in their
transportation plans. Most DOTs are divided into districts and most states
measure the quality of their highways with such yardsticks as the international
roughness index (IRI). These DOTs have also instituted measures of
performance, ranging from organizational effectiveness to the actual quality of
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the transportation system. The availability of such objective measures makes it
possible to devolve decision-making power to the district level.
4. Improve performance and accountability by establishing formal waste
reduction techniques and processes. Resource waste can take several forms
including redundant employees, project over-runs, project delays, and
inadequate maintenance. Institutionalized devices such as Ohio’s requirement
that local governments fund cost over-runs and Florida’s requirement that all
projects in the first three years of their five-year plan be fully funded can help
insure the timely and efficient completion of construction and maintenance
projects, thus reducing waste.
5. Improve performance and accountability by allocating Road Fund resources
on a consistent and objective basis. Managing competition for resources is an
inherent challenge for public departments and agencies. The development of
objective project and system development criteria is especially challenging for
state DOTs due to state diversity (such as urban and rural interests) and
difficulties associated with comparing needs for system maintenance with
demands for system capacity expansion. However, the public’s perception of
objectivity can be enhanced with greater planning process transparency and
public involvement in system and project planning and prioritization processes.
6. Improve performance and accountability by ensuring that sufficient funds are
available to complete projects on time and on budget. Many states have
problems finishing projects in a timely manner resulting in delays which drive
up the cost of the projects. As noted, Florida gives its commission
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responsibility for reviewing projects and finances to make sure that each
project in the work plan has sufficient funding. In Washington State efforts are
under way to improve project delivery based on recommendations in a recent
management audit performed by the Performance Audit Board (now a
responsibility of the commission). The audit report called for the increased use
of “critical path management” and improvement in the supporting information
technology systems. The Ohio DOT takes a different approach; it funds
maintenance projects first. Money left over is then allocated to projects at the
top of its new construction list. Thus, projects are only begun when the money
to finish them is available.
This study suggests that performance and accountability of state DOTs may be
enhanced with the establishment of boards, commissions or councils with oversight authority
and responsibility. The specific responsibilities of such boards and commissions vary
considerably for the 37 states that have established such entities. Their responsibilities vary
from policy setting to budget review to project selection. However, the common impact
appears to be that such entities enhance transparency, credibility and the public perception of
equity and fairness in the transportation planning and system development process. By
building greater public support and understanding of the transportation planning and project
selection process, it is likely that public perceptions regarding DOT performance and
accountability will be enhanced. The case studies conducted as part of this study also
provided a series of suggestions and recommendations for improving accountability and
performance. The value of such suggestions and recommendations will depend, of course, on
how these process options merge with existing practices and processes.
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Chapter 1: Meeting the Transportation Challenge in a Complex and
Politicized Environment
1.1 Overview
State Departments of Transportation (DOTs) are charged with planning, designing,
constructing and maintaining an effective system of roads and other transportation-related
facilities in their states. Within the constraints of available resources, DOTs are asked to
provide as many high quality transportation services and facilities as possible. And, like other
government agencies, their performance can vary for many reasons, including organizational
structures, management processes, and intergovernmental relationships. Thus, DOTs need to
be governed in a manner that facilitates maximum performance as well as promotes
accountability to the taxpayers and residents of their states.
High quality performance and accountability are not easily attained, however. Among
the reasons for this are the inherent complexity of providing a multi-modal service and the
conflicting or inconsistent views of desired performance by the numerous parties involved in
transportation. DOTs are accountable for their performance to the general public, but also in
varying degrees to the governor, the state legislature, and to local, county, and federal
officials. Often they are also accountable to transportation commissions or boards as well. The
DOT’s task is rendered more difficult by its multifaceted nature, as it typically involves the
coordination of several transportation modes, the design and construction of new facilities,
and the maintenance of existing ones. Resources must be allocated in the most technically
efficient manner, but they must also be allocated in a manner judged to be equitable to the
various regions and needs of a state. At all times DOTs are expected to budget efficiently to
not waste the taxpayer’s money. More importantly, perhaps, DOTs are expected to manage
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program cash flows tightly and be able to provide individual project status information that
can convincingly justify any cost increase and/or time delay. Last, to be accountable a DOT
must communicate well with the public to maintain the public’s trust. For this it needs ways to
measure its performance and then inform the public in language the public will understand. It
must also consult with the public in various ways to ensure it is giving transportation users the
system they want at a reasonable cost to the taxpayer.
A glance at the organizational charts of our state DOTs demonstrates that each is
responsible for developing and maintaining a multimodal and intermodal system involving
transportation by road, rail, air and water. The complexity of the transportation system is
compounded further by the intergovernmental nature of American transportation policy.
Many state and local transportation projects rely on federal funding—in full or in part—and,
therefore, must comply with federal regulations and specifications. Thus, each state must find
a way to meld local, state, and federal objectives into a coherent plan for its transportation
system. In doing so it must coordinate all passenger vehicle travel with freight transport on
the highways as well as coordinate the latter two with rail and air transport. At the same time,
it must accommodate pedestrians and cyclists while being sensitive to the physical and social
environment.
This study focuses on the organizational structures and arrangements most likely to
enhance DOT performance and promote DOT accountability in a complex and politicized
environment. This environment is one in which many actors—public and private—are
involved in transportation policy and where methods for holding each accountable are vital to
the pursuit of the public interest. The study’s research question is: Do differences in DOT
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organizational structures and by implication their governance processes impact the
performance and accountability of state DOTs, and if so, how?
1.2 Research Strategy
In pursuing the study’s purpose of determining whether organizational structures can
impact or influence DOT performance and accountability, the first step was a comprehensive
analysis of the organizational structures and authorizing statures of the 50 state DOTs. We
found that all DOTs have divisionalized structures devoted to such specialized areas as
construction, maintenance, planning, and the like. As an organizational strategy,
divisionalization is appropriate, since DOTs produce many outputs from safe roads to
intermodal freight transport. This strategy of divisionalization is analogous to the private
sector’s adoption of the multi-divisional firm, which research indicates is the best fit between
corporate strategy and task on the one hand and organizational structure on the other..
In addition to the operating divisions, 37 of the states had a commission, board, or
council that served a governing, advisory and/or administrative role. Following this
determination, the research plan focused on analyzing how the two different DOT
organizational structures—commission and non-commission—may impact state-level
transportation planning, resource allocation and performance. At this time, there is no
research on the role of transportation commissions; however, research on a similar
institution—State Boards of Education—suggests that the latter tend to improve the
performance of the system of higher education in their respective states (Knott and Payne
2004). State Boards of Education set policy and priorities for state spending on higher
education. Transportation commissions may function in similar ways in regard to decisions
about investments in highway and transportation infrastructure.
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The research was conducted in several steps. In the first step, as noted above, we
reviewed the organizational charts of the 50 state DOTs. We then read the 37 state statutes
that authorize the creation of a commission, analyzing them to discern differences in regard to
commission powers and roles. This involved identifying the commission structures,
characteristics, and responsibilities pertaining to transportation planning and decision making.
We then gathered state-level data on a number of attributes and characteristic relevant
to transportation policy and planning in the 50 states (e.g., the size of their state highway
systems, the number of employees in their DOTs, their gas and diesel tax rates, their GSP per
capita, and the like). In addition, we had several indicators of state DOT performance. With
this data and the information on commission roles and powers, we were able to statistically
assess the impact that commissions and their different powers and roles have on DOT
performance.
In the second research step, we conducted in-depth case studies of five states with
commissions. These required site visits to each state’s DOT. The case study states were
selected based on having high performance grades for capital management of transportation
assets. The study states were: Florida, Maryland, Minnesota, Ohio, and Washington.
The purpose of the site visits was to gather additional information on the role of each
state’s transportation commission in transportation decision-making as well as information on
any other methods used to ensure high performance and accountability. This information
complemented the data collected in the first step. These case studies entailed analysis of
documents obtained from each state as well as information from interviews with high-level
DOT officials conducted during the site visits by members of the research team.
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1.3 Summary
State DOTs perform essential tasks under demanding and difficult circumstances.
Each DOT, moreover, confronts challenges unique to its state’s geography and climate. And
they do so under resource constraints. Nevertheless, they can learn much from each other, as
all operate in an intergovernmental environment and must coordinate multimodal
transportation systems. This study is designed to facilitate DOT effectiveness by identifying
structures and policies that increase performance and accountability. Indeed, the last chapter
will identify recommendations for improvements in organizational structures and their
associated policies to improve DOT decision making.
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Chapter 2: Theories of Accountability and Governance
Recent theoretical work in public administration has addressed the issue of governance
under complex conditions. One line of theoretical thinking arises from the study of employeremployee relationships in the private sector. It looks at the relationship between principals
(the employer) and their agents (the employee or a contractor) and addresses this question:
how can the principal ensure that the agent delivers the desired performance? There are many
answers to this question—direct supervision, detailed contracts, profit-sharing, to name three.
Unfortunately, these techniques work best when the task in question can be clearly defined in
advance and easily measured upon completion. In such situations, the principal has sufficient
information to evaluate the task performance of the agent. In many situations, however, the
agent has more information or information is lacking and must be generated through the
interaction of the interested parties. In these complex situations where the goals and means are
often ambiguous, it can be necessary to turn to governance structures that involve more
discussion between stakeholders. That is, structures must be devised that facilitate cooperation
and trust between agents and principals.
2.1 Accountability Under Three Governance Structures
Hill and Hupe (2002) have created a model of governance structures that relates the
type of managerial task to the appropriate governance structure for implementing policy, of
which there are three: authority; transaction; and persuasion. Each is associated with a
different type of accountability structure—authority with organizational hierarchy; transaction
with marketplace relations; and persuasion with networks in which parties discuss and
negotiate. In general, managers in a hierarchy obtain accountability by making
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responsibilities explicit, creating clarity of tasks, providing sufficient resources to employees,
motivating with appropriate rewards and punishments, and monitoring compliance with
standard operating procedures. In markets, managers create accountability by locating
competent contractors, writing binding contracts, and monitoring and rewarding compliance
with the details of the contract. Obtaining accountability through persuasion and negotiation
in networks requires explicit articulation of discretion, the creation of partnerships,
institutionalization of stakeholder participation, enhancement of professionalization, and
coordination of service delivery by the members of the network.
2.2 The Accountability Environment for DOTs
Hill and Hupe’s typology is directly relevant to the complex challenges facing today’s
DOTs. Directors of DOTs must manage complex stakeholder relations with state governors,
legislators, and local politicians and citizens groups. Increasingly they also confront relations
defined by contracts and open-ended negotiation (Lockwood 1998; Warne 2003; Witheford
1997). And, with the widespread use of transportation commissions, directors of DOTs
confront an additional actor whose concerns must also be addressed. Clearly, in dealing with
its many stakeholders, directors cannot simply give or take orders. They are locked into a
network of relationships with elected and appointed officials from which policy decisions
emerge following much discussion and negotiation. Adding a commission to the mix means
there is one more group of actors with which the DOT director must discuss and negotiate.
Perhaps more than most agencies, DOTs confront a geographically based political
interference to their performance. Elected officials in state legislatures represent local districts
and frequently want to bring road projects to their district or region, whether or not their
particular district has the greatest technical need for the limited funds available for new road

16

construction. In this sense, a state DOT perforce operates in a complex, political environment.
Both the legislature and the governor in most states are interested in its work, its sources of
revenue, and the allocation of its resources. The director of the DOT must answer in various
ways to both of them. This can conflict with the duties and standards of the DOT’s
employees, many of whom are professional engineers committed to objective standards of
technical job performance.
We have then an accountability environment split along two dimensions: (1) the
pursuit of local versus general interest on one axis, and (2) a concern for optimizing the use of
resources versus the maximization of political advantage on the other. Table 2.1 lays out the
interests and value commitments of the major actors in the accountability environment that
surrounds decision-making for transportation-related capital projects.
Table 2.1: Focus of Interest and Dominant Value Commitment of the Major Actors in
the Accountability Environment for Transportation Decision Making
Stakeholder

Focus of Interest

Legislature
Governor
Director of DOT

Local
General
General and Agency

Commissioner Representing
Region
Commissioner Representing
Entire State

Local
General

Dominant Value
Commitment
Political Advantage
Political Advantage
Optimal Technical Use of
Resources
Maximum State Investment
in Region
Optimal Use of Resources

Governors, of course, are elected by all the residents of their state and must strive to
reconcile the general with the various local interests. In contrast, as representatives of specific
localities or regions, elected officials in state legislatures can obtain political advantage by
advocating policies that place local interests above the general interest. This aspect of our
political system can produce conflicts over the geographic distribution of projects. In theory,
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the decision to fund a proposed road project should be a response to objectively measurable
need, as indicated by traffic flows and patterns of population and economic growth, as well as
other objective factors such as road conditions and traffic safety. In practice, however, the
objective data may be ambiguous or conflicting. Moreover, the choice of projects may be
influenced by the political power of specific legislators or various interest groups. Under these
circumstances, it is possible for local interests to trump the general interest.
The foregoing suggests that when there are multiple parties present it is important that
none be too weak or too powerful. In regard to transportation policy, a rough balance among
the governor, the legislature, the commission, if present, and the DOT is desirable. Governors
can be said to represent the public interest. Legislators who represent districts can be said to
represent local interests. DOTs represent the systematic and rational judgments of the
professionals in the bureaucracy as well as the general interest. The addition of a
transportation commission representing the general interest can increase the lines of influence
and the amount of discussion that occurs. In doing so, a transportation commission can
increase transparency, making it more difficult for narrow interests to shape the outcomes of
the decision process (See Figure 2.1).
The purpose of this study is to identify if and how differences in DOT organizational
structures impact the performance and accountability of state DOTs. To this end, the analysis
performed in Chapters 5 seeks to address the question: Do transportation commissions
improve the capital management performance of state DOTs? These transportation
commissions share the accountability environment associated with the implementation of
transportation policy with the governor, the legislature, and the department of transportation.
Kearns (1996) uses the term ‘accountability environment’ to capture the multidimensional
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nature of the quest for accountability in public administration. The implementation of public
policy frequently entails multiple actors and concerns (Behn 2001, 1998; Halachmi 1986;
Dubnick 2005; Yates 1985). Therefore, there is more to accountability than the agency theory
metaphor of hierarchical control of subordinates by their formal superiors (Garson and
Overman 1992). By implication, then, in order to enlarge the sum total of accountability
surrounding a specific government agency, it is necessary to attend to the web of relationships
between the major stakeholders as well as to their capacity to influence each other’s decisions.
Accountability is thus an emergent product of the structure of relations in the accountability
environment (O’Connell 2005)
Figure 2.1: Increasing the Lines of Influence and Negotiation from Three to Potentially
Six with Addition of a Commission
1. Three Parties
Governor

DOT

Legislature

2. Four Parties
Governor

Commission

DOT

Legislature

As we demonstrate in our review of the statutes in the findings, the transportation
commissions appear to possess relatively little formal power. Nevertheless, as this research
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will show, transportation commissions appear to have a salutary effect on DOT performance.
Before describing our methods, data, and findings, we discuss some recent work on the quest
for accountability under various governance structures. This work sees accountability
emerging from negotiations between the parties that share powers in a broad accountability
environment (Kearns 1996; Hill and Hupe 2003; Hult and Walcott 1990, O’Connell 2005).
This approach to accountability suggests that even a relatively weak commission can augment
the quality of performance of its state DOT.
From its first steps, the field of public administration has struggled to define the proper
role of elected officials in the administration of public policy. The Wilsonian formulation that
politicians establish the policy and its objectives, but leave the technical details of
administration to objective and neutral experts in the bureaucracy, is frequently unattainable
in practice (Hult and Walcott 1990; Graham and Hays 1986). Moreover, even when the goals
are clear and the bureaucracy able and motivated, politicians can meddle in the policy to aid
various special interests (Lindblom 1980; Yates 1982). That is, as Wilson (1887) feared,
elected officials can thwart the public interest in efficient administration. This presents a
problem that can best be summarized in the question: How can the public keep its elected and
appointed servants focused on the general interest as opposed to the various special interests?
This study assessed the efficacy in the area of transportation infrastructure policy of
one approach to this problem—the creation of state transportation commissions to oversee the
work of their state DOTs. As of 2000, 37 of the 50 states have created transportation
commissions, councils, boards, and other types of independent external bodies to advise,
oversee, or govern their state DOT. In this report, we will refer to these independent bodies as
commissions, since most are called that. As we found from our review of their authorizing
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statutes, their powers tend to be limited and they are rarely given explicit roles in every day
DOT operations (e.g., the power to select, rank or prioritize projects), but the statutes do tend
to confer upon commissions some role in transportation policy, finance, and decision-making.
There has been little research on how these government entities distribute resources across a
state; but a recent study of statewide education boards suggests that oversight boards or
commissions can shape policy and ultimately the distribution of desired resources (Knott and
Payne 2004).
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Chapter 3: Comparison of the States by Organizational Structures:
Commission and Non-Commission States
Our initial survey of DOT organizational structures across the 50 American states
found that there were not many differences among the states. With few exceptions, DOTs
have a top administrative official who reports to the state’s elected governor. The DOTs are
divided into functional divisions headed by division managers who report to the top
administrative manager. However, there was one obvious difference between them – some
state DOT organizational charts indicated the presence of a commission, council, or board,
either in an advisory, governing, or leadership capacity. Further investigations determined that
these commissions, councils, or boards are quasi-independent bodies that play some role in
transportation decision making. Given this initial finding, the remainder of the research
focused on the organizational differences between commission and non-commission
organizational structures.
A review of the transportation statutes (up-to-date as of April 2004) indicated that 37
states had quasi-independent bodies referred to as Commissions, Councils, Boards, or
Committees while the remaining 13 states did not have such quasi-independent bodies
involved in their transportation planning. Figure 3.1 geographically summarizes these
commission and non-commission states (commission states are highlighted in this map).
Geographically, commission states are mostly located in the central and western parts of the
U.S. Some states along the eastern seaboard are also categorized as commission states.
3.1 Research Method
We gathered data from several sources to explore the contribution of commissions to
the general performance of DOTs. Our measure of state DOT performance is based on the
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results of the 2000 Government Performance Project or GPP (Barret et al. 2001; Ebdon 2001;
Government Performance Project 2002). The Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public
Affairs at Syracuse University conducted a study that estimated the efficiency and
performance of state governments. The relevant performance measure is from the 2000 GPP,
which included in the assessment of state management of capital assets measures specifically
related to transportation. Performance grades for capital management were based on three
components: (1) capital planning, (2) project management, and (3) asset maintenance. Three
primary sources – survey responses, government documents, and interviews with state
officials – were used to collect the data on which the grades were based. The GPP assessed
procedures for capital management for all state resources. However, it is a good measure of
capital performance for DOTs, given the large ratio of highway capital expenditures to all
capital outlays for construction in the states—approximately 70 % of state capital outlays are
for highways (see Table 3.1).
Table 3.1: State Government Expenditures for Highway Capital Outlays, 1997 – 2003

Year
2002-03
2001-02
2000-01
1999-00
1998-99
1997-98
Average

Highway Capital
Outlays ($ thousands)
48,718,935
49,271,518
44,760,853
41,650,642
37,986,175
35,008,489
42,899,435

Capital Outlays for
Construction ($
thousands)
72,374,446
71,034,814
64,668,030
59,680,668
53,856,968
50,541,874
62,026,133

Highway Capital
Outlay as Percentage of
Capital Outlays for
Construction
67.3%
69.4%
69.2%
69.8%
70.5%
69.3%
69.2%

Source: U.S. Census Bureau’s Census of Governments and Annual Survey of Government Finances.
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Figure 3.1: Commission and Non-Commission States (37 Commission States and 13 Non-Commission States), as of April 2002
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Note: Minnesota and Kansas both had commissions in 2000. The analysis in Chapter 5 was based on 2000 data, so for regression analysis
purposes, Minnesota and Kansas were treated as commission states.
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In the GPP, each state received a grade from A to D. The distribution of grades is
presented in Table 3.2. The scores have a normal distribution with a grade of B as the midpoint.
We turned these letter grades into numerical grades similar to those used to determine academic
grade point averages. For example, A = 4.000, A- = 3.667, B+ = 3.333, B = 3.000, etc.
Table 3.2: Distribution of GPP grades for Management of Capital Assets in the States
Grade
A
AB+
B
BC+
C
CD+
D

Number of States
1
4
7
12
9
8
6
1
1
1

3.2 Does Having a Commission Impact Performance?
The important research question for Phase 1 of this study, apart from identifying the
commission and non-commission organizational structures, was to determine if having a
commission impacts the performance of the state’s DOT. In essence, this involves determining
whether commission states perform better than do non-commission states. To this end, we
utilized two measures of state DOT performance. The first measure, highway capital outlays per
vehicle-miles traveled (VMT), is a measure of the DOT’s responsiveness to transportation needs
in the state. (This measures makes the assumption that spending per VMT translates into a better
maintained state highway system.)
The second measure, the Government Performance Project (GPP) Capital Management
Grade, reflects the state’s management of its transportation infrastructure. The GPP Grade
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encompasses three aspects of transportation infrastructure management: (1) capital planning; (2)
project management; and (3) asset maintenance.
A comparison of the two performance measures for commission and non-commission
states, presented in Table 3.3, shows that in fact, having a commission does make a difference.
Commission states had, on average, higher capital management grades and spent more on
highway capital outlays than did non-commission states. For both performance measures the
differences between commission and non-commission states were statistically significant.
Table 3.3: Comparison of Average Performance Measures for Commission and NonCommission States
Performance Measure
GPP Grade for Capital Management* (A=4.00,
B=2.00, C=1.00, etc. )
Highway Capital Outlays per VMT**
**
significant at the 0.05 level
*
significant at the 0.10 level
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Commission States
(N=37)
2.83

Non-Commission
States (N=13)
2.43

$1.56

$1.14

Chapter 4: An In-Depth Analysis of the Transportation Commission Statutes
and Commission Roles and Powers
We reviewed the transportation statutes of the 50 states. As noted earlier, 37 of the
statutes had a section authorizing the creation of a quasi-independent body to serve in an
oversight or advisory capacity for some aspect of the duties of the state DOT. Variously referred
to as commissions, boards, authorities and the like, they tend to differ in their specific powers
and responsibilities. Moreover, as we demonstrate in this chapter, a review of the authorizing
statutes of the states with commissions suggests that their powers may not be extensive.
The statutes tend to be broadly written with few details of commission powers and
responsibilities. We could only note statutory reference to a limited set of roles. In addition to
commission powers and roles, the review of transportation statutes identified several features or
characteristics unique to some commissions. For example, several commissions had statutory
restrictions on the political party composition of the commission, with the goal of ensuring equal
representation of the political parties. Washington’s statutes, for instance, specify that "not more
than four members of the commission shall at the time of appointment or thereafter during their
respective terms of office be members of the same major political party" (RCW 47.01.051).
Many states had selection criteria to ensure that commission members are selected to
represent specified geographic regions. In Florida, for example, the composition of the
commission must include members representing all geographical areas of the state.
The method of selection or appointment of commission members also varies across the
states. In most states, commission members are citizens appointed by the Governor with
approval from the legislature. But in a minority of states, the commission is comprised of a
combination of citizens and elected officials (such as the Governor and key legislators). These
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different characteristics are summarized in Table 4.2. The most common type of membership
composition is citizen commissioners appointed by the governor. In addition, representation by
geographic region is more likely to be statutorily mandated than representation by political party.
Table 4.2 also lays out the number of commissions with specific attributes for the 37
states with commissions. While only 13 states (35%) have statutes that stipulate that the
members of the commission come from both major political parties, 22 have statutes (60%) that
insist that their transportation commission members come from specific regions in their state.
This guarantees geographic representation for all the major areas in a particular state.
Many of the statutes conferred specific roles on their commissions. We noted the
reference to the six roles defined in Table 4.1: (1) policy making; (2) short-term planning; (3)
long-range planning; (4) project selection; (5) financial management and oversight; and (6) the
power to nominate candidates for or select the director of the DOT.
Table 4.1: Five Roles and Responsibilities of Transportation Commissions

Policy making

Short-term planning
Long-range planning

Project selection
Financial
management and
oversight
Selection of the DOT
director

Policy making encompasses determining statewide transportation
policy, in addition to departmental policies such as rules and
regulations pertaining to the administration and operations of the
Department of Transportation.
Short-term planning is defined as transportation planning activities
with durations less than 10 years.
Long-range planning is defined as planning activities with time
horizons beyond 10 years. This includes comprehensive and balanced
statewide transportation planning and long-term multimodal planning.
Project selection encompasses all activities related to the selection,
ranking and prioritization of projects and the matching of these
projects to the budget and other funding sources.
Financial management and oversight involves all fiscal activities
related to the financing and managing of transportation systems. It
includes budget development, resource allocation, bond issuance and
financial audits.
Statute states that commission either nominates candidates or selects
the candidates for director of the DOT.
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The percentage of statutes that mention specific role-enabling powers and attributes are
summarized in Table 4.2. A role in policy development was the most frequently mentioned
power. In total, 28 statutes (76%) give their respective commissions a role in the creation of
policy for their department of transportation. Given the importance of financial accountability
and project selection to overall DOT performance, it is not surprising that, 65% of statutes
mention financial oversight as a commission role and 60% grant a role in project selection.
Planning roles were mentioned less frequently in the statutes—43% of the statutes mentioned
each type of planning role.
At the other extreme, only 10 (27%) of the statutes give the commission a role in the
selection of the director of the DOT. There were two methods in the statutes used to grant the
commission a role in the selection of the DOT director, one direct and one less so. The Missouri
Highway and Transportation Commission directly appoints the DOT Director. Florida takes a
less direct approach—its transportation commission nominates three candidates for the Secretary
of Transportation and the governor then makes the final appointment. Thus, the commission’s
role, while less direct, is still quite substantial.
Table 4.2: Number and Percent of State Transportation Commissions with Eight Roles
and Attributes Mentioned in Their Authorizing Statutes (N=37)
Role or Attribute
Members represent specific regions of state
Commission must contain members of both major
political parties
Role in the development of DOT policy
Role in long term planning
Role in project selection
Role in financial oversight
Role in short term planning
Role in selecting the director of the DOT
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Number
22
13

Percent
60%
35%

28
16
22
24
16
10

76%
43%
60%
65%
43%
27%

Table 4.3: Distribution of the Number of Roles Mentioned in Statutes Authorizing 37
Commissions
Number of Roles
0
1
2
3
4
5
6

Number of Commissions
1
8
5
7
5
9
2

Percent
3%
22%
14%
19%
14%
25%
6%

The statutes tend to grant a circumscribed number of powers to their commissions, with
only a few granting all the powers to their commissions. As Table 4.4 shows, only 6% of the
statutes mentioned all the roles. Conversely, 22% mentioned only one role. The median number
of roles attributed to commissions is 3 and the mean number of roles is 3.14. In other words,
many commissions appear to have limited roles to play in transportation decision-making. Still,
with three-fourths having a statutorily authorized voice in policy setting, it is possible that a
majority of states can assume the other roles even when they are not explicitly mentioned in the
authorizing statute.
The finding in the previous chapter that the commission states outperform the noncommission states gives rise to this question: do the states with commissions differ from those
without commissions on some of the factors such as financial resources that could explain their
superior performance? In Table 4.4, the 37 states with a commission are compared to those
without a commission on several factors: gross state product, miles in the state highway system,
governor’s institutional power score, and the gas tax and diesel tax rates per gallon. None of the
comparisons are statistically significant. Commission states have lower gross state products,
lower governor’s power scores, and more lane miles in their state highway systems to care for.
While there is little difference in their gas tax rates, the commission states do have a slightly
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higher tax on diesel. Thus it appears that none of these variables could account for the higher
GPP score for capital management. Nevertheless, we will include them in the regression analyses
in the next chapter.
Table 4.4: Comparison of Commission versus Non-Commission States on Variables of
Interest
T-value

$31,194
16,319

NonCommission
State (N=13)
$32,558
12,929

20.568

21.115

0.695

$0.217
$0.224

$0.216
$0.208

-0.092
-0.997

Variables

Commission
State (N=37)

Gross State Product per Capita
Lane Miles in the State Highway
System
Governor’s Institutional Power Score
(out of 25)
Gas Tax Rate (per Gallon)
Diesel Tax Rate (per Gallon)

0.681
0.608

4.1 Techniques for Ensuring Political Independence/Neutrality
In addition to the previously described powers and characteristics of transportation or
highway commissions, we also examined several features of the commissions that serve to
ensure their political independence or neutrality. For example, several states have restricted
termination clauses that protect the commission members. Washington, for instance, has a statute
that reads “commissioners shall not be removed from office by the governor before the
expiration of their terms except…for cause based upon a determination of incapacity,
incompetence, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office by the Superior Court of the state of
Washington.” In addition, some states have statutes that prohibit commission members from
holding other political positions or from deriving personal gain from their service on the
commission.
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4.2 Recent Trends in State Adoption and Roles of Commission
We were only able to identify five recent changes in DOT commission structures and
roles. Ohio went from being a non-commission state to a commission state with the creation of
the Transportation Review Advisory Council in 1997. Mississippi went from having a highway
commission to having a multi-modal transportation commission in 1992. In 2004, the statutes
pertaining to the transportation commissions were allowed to expire in Kansas and Minnesota.
West Virginia repealed the statute creating its Road Commission in 1995.
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Chapter 5: Regression Analyses of Commission Attributes and
Characteristics that Predict GPP Performance
We saw that states with transportation commissions appear to be more effective at capital
management. But as we noted in the previous chapter, this could be due to a number of factors
besides the presence of a commission. In this chapter we use regression analysis to compare the
impact on DOT performance of the variables discussed in the previous chapter . If the presence
of a commission is a positive and statistically significant predictor of GPP score—our measure of
capital management performance—then we can be more confident that commissions do
contribute to improved capital management. In the analysis the variables of interest are the
presence of commissions, the different features of commissions, the governor’s institutional
power, the size of the state’s highway system, and the economic resources of the state. We have
two measures of the latter—the gross state product and the combined gas and diesel tax rates.
Since the role of governors varies from state to state, we used Beyle’s (n.d.) measure of
the institutional power of state governors as a control. Strong governors may serve as an
additional check on the demands of local legislators. A summary of all other variables and their
data sources are presented in Tables 5.1 and 5.2
Financial resources also vary across the states. We included three measures of financial
resources in our analyses: the gas tax rate; the diesel tax rate, and the state’s GSP per capita. In
the regression analysis we combined the measures of tax rates into a single indicator to eliminate
multicollinearity. To control for differences in the size of the state highway systems we included
the number of lane miles in each state’s highway system in the regression.
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Table 5.1: Description of Variables and Data Sources, except Commission Roles and
Powers
Variable
GPP Score
Commission
Present
Both Parties
Represented in
Commission
Geographic
Representation in
Commission

Number of
Commission Roles

Governor's
Institutional Power
Score
Size of State
Highway System
(in thousands)
Combined Motor
Fuels Taxes
GSP per Capita (in
thousands)

Operationalization
State's numerical grade for the capital
management component of the 2000
Government Performance Project.
A transportation commission, council or
board is defined in the statutes. Coded 1 if
commission is present, 0 otherwise.
Statutes require that both political parties be
represented in the commission. Coded 1 if
political party representation is required, 0
otherwise.
Statutes require that commission members
represent specific geographic region. Code 1
if geographic representation is required, 0
otherwise.
Count of roles attributed to the commission
in the statutes. Ranges from 0 to 5. Coded as
0 if the commission has no statutory
authority, 1 if the commission is statutorily
assigned one of the five transportation
roles/functions, etc.

Data Source
Government Performance Project,
State Grade Report 2001 (Barret
et al 2001)

2000 Governor's Institutional Power Scores

Data compiled by Thad Beyle

Lane Miles of State Highway in State
Highway System, 2000

GAO Report number GAO-03915SP: Trends in State Capital
Investment in Highways

Sum of the gas and diesel fuel tax rates, 2000

FHWA Highway Statistics, 2000

Gross State Product per Capita, 2000

U.S. Census Bureau
Statistical Abstract
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Analysis of state statutes

Analysis of state statutes

Analysis of state statutes

Analysis of state statutes

Table 5.2: Specific Commission Roles and Powers Mentioned in Statutes
Variable
Role in Long Term
Planning
Role in Project
Selection

Operationalization

Data Source

Statute mentions involvement in
constructing plans of more than 10
years. 1 = yes; 0 = no
Statute mentions a role in project
selection. 1 = yes; 0 = no

Role in Financial
Management

Statute mentions a role in financial
management. 1 = yes; 0 = no
Statute mentions involvement in
Role in short Term
constructing plans of 10 or fewer
Planning
years. 1 = yes; 0 = no
Statute provides direct commission
involvement in selection of DOT
Direct Commission
Director. Coded 1 if commission
Involvement in
Selection/nomination nominates director candidates or
selects the DOT Director, 0
of DOT Director
otherwise.
Statute mentions a role in
Role in the
development of DOT policy. 1 =
Development of
yes; 0 = no.
DOT policy

Analysis of state statutes
Analysis of state statutes
Analysis of state statutes
Analysis of state statutes

Analysis of state statutes.

Analysis of state statutes.

With measures for each of these variables, we can assess the validity of the following
hypotheses about the impact of commissions and their attributes on capital management.
5.1 Three Hypotheses
The analysis in this chapter involved looking at differences in DOT capital management
between states with and without transportation commissions. DOT performance depends on two
factors: (1) addressing the broad transportation needs of the state; and (2) the optimal use of
scarce resources based on technical criteria. Given the different focus of interests and value
commitments of the multiple actors (as discussed in Chapter 2), transportation commissions may
be able to shift the focus away from gaining electoral success, injecting instead greater emphasis
on the use of technical criteria for resource allocation. Commissions, if structured correctly, may
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also be able to advocate for the state’s general interests, reducing some of the local-oriented
political influence that may detract from DOT performance.
The addition of a commission to the accountability environment, therefore, creates a new
actor that can potentially advocate for greater general interests and emphasize the optimal use of
technical expertise to determine resource allocation, thus improving performance.
H1: States with transportation commissions will have higher performance scores for
capital management.
Our review of the 50 state transportation statutes (discussed below) identified three
frequently specified attributes of commission structure: (1) the specific powers and roles granted
to the commission (e.g., statutory involvement in policy formation); (2) a requirement that
commissioners be representative of both major political parties; and (3) a requirement that
commissioners come from different regions of their state. The first two of these seem likely to
improve commission performance, since powerful commissions and participation by
commissioners from both parties seem likely to increase the ability of commissions to represent
and pursue the public interest. Knott and Payne’s (2004) study of statewide education boards
found that strong education boards possess more control over education budgets and academic
programs, having greater impact on the performance of their educational institutions. It is likely,
therefore, that as the commissions acquire additional powers and roles, they can better improve
the performance of their DOTs. Commissions with mandated representation from both political
parties also seem likely to reduce legislative and gubernatorial influence in project selection and
other decisions, further enhancing the DOT’s performance.
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H2: States with powerful commissions will have higher performance scores for capital
management. States with mandated commissioner representation from both political
parties will have higher performance scores for capital management.
We have theorized that commissions represent the general interest and transportation
needs of the state. Some commissions, however, are statutorily required to select commissioners
to represent specific areas or regions in their states. These states may not perform as well as
those with statutes that do not require such representation, because the local interests of
geographically-constrained commissions may subvert (subjugate) the commission’s general
interest. Thus, commissioners chosen to represent regions could undermine the general interest
by, for example, working with their legislatures to bring unnecessary projects to their regions. If
so, they would be acting as a fourth party in pursuit of local, rather than general public interests.
H3: States that mandate geographical representation in commission membership will have
lower performance scores for capital management.
5.2 Results of Regression Analyses
We used regression analysis to test the three hypotheses. Regression results are
summarized in Table 5.3. Along with the two measures of state resources, the independent
variables were: governor’s institutional power score; the presence of a commission; statutory
representation of both parties; the number of specified commission roles and powers; and
statutory representation of geographic areas. To compute the measure of commission power we
added the number of roles mentioned in each state’s authorizing statute.

37

Table 5.3: Unstandardized and Standardized Regression Coefficients Predicting GPP
Score
Independent Variable
(Constant)
Governor’s Institutional Power
Commission Present
Both Parties Represented in
Commission
Geographic Representation in
Commission
GSP per Capita (in thousands)
Combined Gas Diesel Rate
Lane Miles of State Highway (in
thousands)
Commission Roles and Powers
R2
Adjusted R2

-0.642
0.052
0.698

Standard
Error
0.896
0.034
0.266

-0.117

Coefficient

Beta

t-value

p-value

0.201
0.496

-0.716
1.533
2.625

0.476
0.133
0.012

0.192

-0.083

-0.613

0.543

-0.233

0.187

-0.187

-1.247

0.219

0.032
0.021

0.000
0.009

0.266
0.301

2.003
2.360

0.052
0.023

0.003

0.000

0.169

1.248

0.219

-0.033
0.377
0.250

0.057

-0.107

0.588

0.560

In support of Hypothesis 1, the presence of a commission is a positive predictor of GPP
grade (b = .496, p = .01). Both measures of resources were also significant at the .05 level. The
results do not support Hypothesis 2. Neither commission power nor mandated representation
from both political parties predicted higher capital performance. Hypothesis 3 was not supported.
Although geographical representation was a negative predictor, it failed to reach statistical
significance.
5.3 Discussion
From the review of their authorizing statutes, we found that 37 states have established
independent entities, usually referred to as commissions, to work with their DOTs. The
regression analyses suggest that these entities make a positive contribution to capital
management. Since it is not possible to do a panel study of commissions with measures of
performance before and after the adoption of the commission the findings are suggestive only.
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The results did not support our second and third hypotheses. Geographic representation,
although negatively signed as predicted, was not statistically significant. The more powerful
commissions and those with mandated geographic and political representation are not more
effective. On balance, it could be that it is the addition of a commission as a stakeholder in the
accountability environment surrounding transportation decision-making is sufficient to improve
performance, no matter the attributes of the commission.
The failure of geographic representation to improve performance is to be expected, since
state legislators also represent local interests. The lack of impact for mandated political
representation may reflect the willingness of both parties to pursue regional interest. In regard to
commission roles and powers, our measure may be too crude to capture the differences.
A commission may also contribute to performance by serving as a buffer between the
governor and legislature on the one hand and the DOT on the other. With a commission as a
buffer, the DOT director may have more flexibility to make more systematic and rational
recommendations and decisions.
Perhaps, also, the presence of a commission promotes effectiveness by encouraging the
application of more universalistic standards when making capital management decisions. Unlike
elected officials, commission members may not be under as much political pressure. Thus the
presence of a commission may improve capital management by ratcheting up the willingness and
ability of the DOT to apply engineering considerations to its capital planning. This seems to be
the case in Ohio, which has a commission authorized to rank and select new highway projects
based on a set of objective engineering and economic criteria.
But a commission may improve performance for other reasons. The act of consultation
with a commission can inject more diverse information and analysis into decision-making and
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planning. In situations burdened with controversy, research suggests that decision structures that
air conflicts generate better decisions (Schweiger et al. 1986). A commission can also enhance
public acceptance of decisions by generating more transparency in the decision process. This
legitimating effect is another reason for the widespread turn to commissions in the area of
transportation. In a politicized environment in which controversy is common the states can be
expected to look for and imitate governance structures that confer legitimacy (DiMaggio &
Powell 1991). Maryland has a commission with little power. It sets policy and consults with the
governor. However Maryland has a policy that mandates negotiation throughout its decisionmaking process, as DOT officials must consult each year with county officials on a final list of
projects that are recommended to the governor, who makes the final decision.
Taken together, these results are consistent with the idea that accountability is more likely
to emerge in an environment characterized by multi-party negotiation and increased lines of
communication. The presence of an additional party in the form of a commission appears to
improve performance by increasing discussion and transparency.
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Chapter 6: Lessons for Increasing Accountability from Five Case Studies of
Commission States
States with commissions appear to perform better. The statistical analyses suggested that
it is the effective presence of a commission rather than the number of powers and responsibilities
the particular commission may possess that contributes to improved capital performance by the
DOT. To deepen our understanding of the ways in which a commission can contribute to its
DOT’s capital performance, we conducted case studies of five states with above average GPP
scores. We reviewed background information on each state and then conducted on-site
interviews with high ranking officials in the DOT in each state. (The list of officials interviewed
is provided in Appendix B).
To give our work an organizing focus we developed an interview instrument with two
themes: (1) project selection and prioritization and (2) project funding. The interview instrument
is included in this report in Appendix C. We then asked officials to describe in detail the project
selection, prioritization, and funding process in their states. The questions were written to elicit
the powers and responsibilities of the major actors involved—including their transportation or
highway commission. The full descriptions and discussions of the case study states are included
in Appendix A.
Our conversations with the officials gave us a much clearer picture of the ways in which
their respective commissions made contributions to their states and in the case of Minnesota gave
us an insight into the ineffectiveness of commissions.
The observations and findings from these case studies appear to be consistent with the
findings of another Kentucky Transportation Center study titled “Meeting Kentucky’s
Transportation Needs and Priorities: Citizen’s Perceptions and Recommendations” (Hartman et

41

al. 2005). The study’s report made two recommendations for improving communication between
state DOTs (specifically the Kentucky Transportation Cabinet) and the citizens of the states.
These findings were: (1) devise a decentralized project selection process that begins with public
input at the district level; and (2) hold statewide public hearings to obtain public input regarding
statewide needs and priorities. The findings of this study support these findings and illustrate
how the selected case study states have approached decentralized project selection and enhanced
public input.
6.1 Dimensions of Accountability
The high-scoring states appear to have solved a number of the accountability problems
that we identified in the first chapter. They have mechanisms in place that:
•

reduce unwarranted political influence in project selection and prioritization;

•

ensure an emphasis on system maintenance and preservation;

•

require meetings at the local or district level to increase communication, trust, and
transparency;

•

ensure fair allocation of resources to each region of the state;

•

reduce wasteful expenditures; and

•

ensure sufficient funding to complete projects in an efficient manner.

Not every state had a mechanism to address each dimension of accountability. What is
more, the individual commissions did not necessarily contribute to each of these accountability
concerns, but in each state the commissions contributed to one or more of them.
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Table 6.1: Characteristics of the State Transportation Systems in Case Study States
Florida
Size of the State Highway System (lane miles)
Transportation Expenditures (billions)
Transportation Capital Expenditures (billions)
Vehicle Miles Traveled in the State (millions)
Size of Work Force (full-time equivalents)
GPP Capital Management Grade

Maryland

Minnesota

Ohio

Washington

40,834

14,624

29,140

48,625

18,298

$6.7
$3.6
185,511
8,379
B-

$1.8
$0.8
54,701
4,740
A

$2.0
$0.7
55,296
5,092
B+

$3.6
$1.6
108,938
7,061
B

$2.3
$0.9
55,015
6,835
A-

Table 6.2: Characteristics of the Transportation Commissions of the Case Study States

Establishment
Year
Size of
Commission

Florida

Maryland

1987

1971

9

17

Appointment
Term

4 years

Membership and
Appointment

Citizen members
appointed by the
Governor with
approval by the
Senate

Staggered Terms

No

3 years (Governor
appointees) and
5 years (State Roads
Commission)
10 citizen members
appointed by the
Governor;
7 members of State
Roads Commission
are ex-officio.
Yes

Minnesota
2000 (terminated in
2002)

Ohio

Washington

1997

1977

20

9

7

No appointment term

5 years

6 years

5 citizen members, 7
members of the
House; 7 members of
the Senate;
Commissioner of
Transportation
No

6 citizen members
appointed by the
Governor; 1 appointed
by the House; 1
appointed by the
Senate; ODOT Director
Yes
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Citizen members appointed
by the Governor with
approval by the Legislature
Yes

6.2 Background Information on the Case Study States
While all the study states have above average GPP scores and commissions, they differ in a
number of respects. Two of them are among the nation’s most populous states—Florida and
Ohio. The others—Minnesota, Maryland, and Washington are midsized states. Transportation
expenditures appear to follow the number of residents more than the size of the system as
measured by the number of lane miles in the state highway system. Table 6.1 summarizes
important characteristics of the selected case study DOTs. The transportation commissions in the
selected states also varied (see Table 6.3). Commission size ranged from 9 members to 20
members. Their appointment terms varied from 3 years to 6 years. More interestingly, the
composition of the commissions differed, with some being fully comprised of citizen members,
some including ex-officio members such as the DOT Director, and some having legislative
members.

6.2.1 Florida
The Florida Department of Transportation (FDOT) has a central office in Tallahassee and
7 district offices located throughout the state. Each of the district offices is headed by a Secretary
and has major operating and planning responsibilities consistent with FDOT’s decentralized
management and operational style. While organizational structures vary, the districts have
operating divisions that focus on administration, planning, and production and operations in
some form.
Florida Department of Transportation policies and activities are monitored and/or
supervised by the Florida Transportation Commission , which was established in 1987. The
commission is a citizens’ oversight board which is independent of the FDOT and has its own
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staff. In 1989, the Florida Legislature decided to enhance the role and responsibilities of the
Florida Transportation Commission, statutorily granting three commission powers: (1) review of
the performance of the Florida Department of Transportation; (2) review the department’s Work
Program; and (3) responsibility to propose three nominees to the Governor for the Secretary of
Transportation. The Commission conducts a statutorily-mandated annual review of the FDOT’s
tentative 5-year Work Program. Review of the Work Program ensures that sufficient funds exist
to accomplish the projects in the plan.
The organizational structures used to meet the six accountability goals are discussed next.
1. Reduce unwarranted political influence in project selection and prioritization
The Legislature can add specific earmarked projects to the Work Program but the cost of
such projects have to be offset by Work Program reductions in the district where the
legislatively-initiated project resides. Moreover, if legislatively added projects are included in the
transportation appropriation bill, the Governor can line-item veto these projects. The current
Governor, Governor Bush, has vetoed every project that the Legislature has added to the 5-year
Work Program.
2. Ensure an emphasis on system maintenance and preservation
FDOT’s funding emphasis is on system preservation and maintenance. Statutes specify
that at least 50% of funds for the Florida Interstate Highway System funds must be used for
preservation and maintenance. Remaining funds after system preservation and maintenance
needs are addressed can then be used for capacity improvement.
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3. Require meetings at the local or district level to increase communication, trust, and
transparency
The Florida Department of Transportation has established a decentralized project
evaluation and selection process which includes (1) local (by the district) and state wide (by the
Commission) public hearings; (2) input from metropolitan planning organizations (MPOs) and/or
counties; and (3) the professional expertise and judgment of the district Secretary and his or her
staff. The districts develop draft work plans for their area which includes all transportation
construction and maintenance. While preparing the district plans, they hold public hearings and
receive feedback from local interest groups including the MPOs in their district.
As indicated, project selection involves a cooperative effort between MPOs or counties
(for areas without MPOs) and the FDOT district offices July and January of each fiscal year. The
MPOs and counties in non-urbanized areas provide their FDOT districts with a prioritized list of
local projects. The district office then identifies and reviews project information, including cost
estimates and construction scheduling. The FDOT districts then develop their respective 5-year
Work Programs in conjunction with MPOs and local governments prior to submission to the
FDOT for approval by the Secretary of Transportation.
Figure 6.1: FDOT’s Bottom-up Planning Process
Transportation Commission
Statewide Work Plan is certified
FDOT Central Office

FDOT Districts

District Work Plans compiled into
Statewide Work Plan

District Work Plans prepared
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4. Ensure fair allocation of resources to each region of the state
The Florida Transportation Commission has 9 members, who serve four year terms, and
are appointed by the Governor and confirmed by the Senate. By state statute, commission
members must be selected to equitably represent all geographic areas of the state. Historically,
this spatial precedent requirement has been met by having one commissioner appointed from
each of the seven districts supplemented with two at-large commissioners with rail and port
expertise, respectively.
5. Reduce wasteful expenditures
The Commission is responsible for certifying the Work Program that has been approved
by the Secretary of the Transportation Department, and submitting it, on behalf of the
Department, to the Governor and the Legislature. As previously noted, the Legislature can add
specific earmarked projects to the Work Program but the cost of such projects have to be offset
by reductions in the district where the legislatively-initiated project resides. Moreover, the
governor can line-item veto any legislatively added projects.
6. Ensure sufficient funding to complete projects in an efficient manner
The number of eligible projects in a districts work program is determined by estimates of
all sources of available funding. Estimates of state revenues available for allocation to district
projects are made by the state Revenue Estimating Commission (REC). To insure that the Work
Program is funded (particularly the first three years of the five year plan), funding is matched to
specific projects, which are then scheduled or programmed for construction and/or maintenance.
The Florida Transportation Commission was strengthened in 1989, in part, due to
problems associated with the financial mismatching of projects and funds. The mismatch of
commitments with available resources created a lack of credibility and public concern about the
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ability of the Department to meet its financial obligations in a timely and equitable manner. As a
result the Commission was directed to insure that the Department’s Work Program was
financially viable and the Commission was required to certify the Work Program before it went
to the Governor and Legislature.

6.2.2 Maryland
The Maryland Department of Transportation (MDOT) planning office assumes a central
role in project planning and selection. The Office of Planning and Preliminary Engineering
coordinates transportation planning statewide and performs project planning activities. It
prepares the six-year funding program known as the Consolidated Transportation Program
(CTP). By law it must work with the counties and city of Baltimore before presenting the CTP to
the governor and legislature.
The State Report on Transportation, which contains both the 20-year and 6-year
documents, is developed by the planning section in the State Highway Administration (SHA) in
draft form and presented to each of the 23 counties and the city of Baltimore each fall during the
annual tour of the counties. The county officials can react to it and request the addition of other
projects. MDOT officials visit each county to present the proposed work program and plan.
Following the fall tour of the counties, the State Report on transportation is prepared in final
form for presentation to the General Assembly, the legislature in January.
1. Reduce unwarranted political influence in project selection and prioritization
Maryland does not so much reduce politics as invite it by giving a role to local officials.
Project selection in Maryland is a complex process in which actors at all levels of government
are able to participate. During the interviews, the respondents mentioned actors at the local level
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including county and city officials, MPOs, and other local politicians. But, they also described a
significant role for the planners in the SHA, which can evaluate the proposed projects of local
politicians and refuse to put them in the CTP In addition, the director of transportation, the
governor and the legislature are involved in project selection. The process can be said to have
political as well as technical aspects.
SHA’s Office of Planning and Engineering (specifically the Program Development
Division) is responsible for selecting the highway projects for the CTP, but many other actors
have a voice in the selection process. The highway planning process begins with the annual
updates to the highway needs inventory (HNI), which is compiled by SHA planners and serves
as the basis for setting priorities for major capital improvement projects for inclusion in the CTP.
Before the tour of the counties and Baltimore City, planning selects projects for the preliminary
draft of the CTP from the highway needs inventory (HNI). After the tour of the counties and
consultation with local officials, other projects may be added to or removed from the CTP. The
Secretary of Transportation is said to have the final say on the projects that go into the final CTP
draft. Then the proposed CTP goes to the governor for his approval. He can add and subtract
projects. Last it goes to the general assembly for budget approval.
2. Ensure an emphasis on system maintenance and preservation
Pavement management planning is conducted centrally within the Pavement Division of
the Office of Materials Technology (OMT) with funding and project selection approved through
the Office of the Chief Engineer (OCE). The seven engineering districts recommend projects to
be considered in the annual system preservation program and manage construction and
maintenance operations within their districts.
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Maryland has adopted a two-step optimization approach to pavement preservation. The
first step entails the development of investment strategies to reach defined objectives, such as
maximizing highway conditions. This step in the process would identify an objective (e.g.,
resurfacing 120 lane miles of pavement currently classified as fair). The second step is
performed by the 7 districts, which are given the responsibility of identifying the particular miles
to be resurfaced. Computer programs have been developed for each step.
3. Require meetings at the local or district level to increase communication, trust, and
transparency.
The Regional and Intermodal Planning Division (RIPD) within the Office of Planning
and Preliminary Engineering is responsible for long range systems planning and the integration
of SHA’s program with regional and local transportation plans. RIPD prepares briefing packages
for the annual Consolidated Transportation Program (CTP) Tour that visits each county and
Baltimore City to meet with local officials. It also tracks the follow-up assignments and changes
in the CTP generated at Tour meetings. Each team is responsible for long range planning for
their areas and works with MPOs, counties, and local governments. In addition, the regional
planning teams assist in the preparation of the Highway Needs Inventory (HNI), which is SHA’s
long-term, financially unconstrained planning document that serves as a source document of the
CTP.
The State Report on Transportation, which contains both the 20-year and 6-year planning
documents, is developed by the planning section in the SHA in draft form and presented to each
of the 23 counties and the city of Baltimore each fall during the annual tour of the counties. The
county officials can react to it and request the addition of other projects. MDOT officials visit
each county to present the proposed program and plan. Following the fall tour of the counties,
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the State Report on transportation is prepared in final form for presentation to the General
Assembly, the legislature in January.
4. Ensure fair allocation of resources to each region of the state;
Each year the local districts send a letter to the planning office with their list of priorities.
There is a formula for how much money is allocated to each district for system preservation. The
planning department will allocate money to all the counties, assuming that all counties have a
need for funds. However, the more populated regions get more money. In the opinion of one
respondent, if planning were to use totally objective standards then some counties would get
nothing. So there is some political influence insofar as projects and funds must be distributed
throughout the counties and regions.
5. Reduce wasteful expenditures
The Office of Planning and Engineering uses technical criteria to assess proposed
projects. Planners from SHA will do preliminary studies if the county says it has a transportation
problem. Feasibility studies are conducted to see if the problems described by the counties
warrant a project. However, if the pre-planning study determines that no problem exists, the
project will not get placed on the CTP. Thus, engineering criteria are said to enter the evaluation
of all proposed projects.
However, there is no official scoring/evaluation system in the planning office. Staff in the
Office of Planning and Engineering work with MPOs, MDOT, and the counties and brainstorms
about what the needs of the state are and how much funding is available. SHA’s Office of
Planning and Engineering will have its own list of potential projects and will match it with the
counties’ lists during the tour of the counties.
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6. Ensure sufficient funding to complete projects in an efficient manner
Maryland has limits on spending and will not give the counties everything they want.
However, with the exception of borrowing limits, there appear to be no policies specifically
designed to match project authorization to available funds.

6.2.3 Minnesota
Minnesota Department of Transportation (Mn/DOT) operations is divided into 8
transportation districts statewide under the supervision of the Mn/DOT’s Division of District
Operations. The districts are responsible for construction programming, planning, designing,
constructing, and maintaining state highways. Each district is headed by a transportation district
engineer who leads the development of the transportation system in his region, while
coordinating those efforts with the other districts and the Mn/DOT central office.
Mn/DOT uses a fiscally-constrained long-range plan that spans 23 years. The long-range
planning process begins with the districts identifying its needs to meet their performance targets.
Given these needs, the district then prioritizes its projects according to available funding, first
emphasizing the preservation of bridges and highways. This emphasis on system preservation,
combined with limited funding, caused many needed capital projects to disappear from the list.
The Minnesota Major Transportation Projects Commission was created by the legislature
through the 2000 Transportation Bill. The focus of the Commission was major projects, defined
as those multimillion dollar projects that constitute more than 25% of a district’s annual
construction budget.

Its goal was to review these major projects, cut those it considers

unnecessary, and rank remaining projects for submission to the governor and legislature.
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It was expected that the commission would solve the problem of adequately funding
major new capacity projects. With its dispersal of decision making and funding to the districts,
the emphasis had been on system preservation, to the neglect of new construction for capacity
improvement. The state had been forced to resort to incremental construction of major projects –
building projects in several small stages over many years – which resulted in substantial
increases in the overall costs of the projects.
Membership in the Commission is comprised of the Commissioner of Transportation, 14
legislators – 7 senators and 7 representatives – and 5 private citizens appointed by the governor,
one of whom is designated as a representative of the governor. The Commission was structured
to meet regularly to evaluate Minnesota’s proposed major transportation projects and advise the
governor on which projects to pursue. It had no formal power.
The Major Projects Commission was terminated by the legislature in 2002. With twenty
members, the Commission was very large and constituted primarily of legislators, both from the
Senate and from the House. The Commission has been characterized by some as being selfserving, with legislators having pet projects that needed funding expressing interest in serving on
the Commission. It appears that the Commission’s work got bogged down because of the
number of legislators involved in the process. Whatever the reason for its demise, the
commission failed to achieve its goals of improving project selection and reducing waste.
1. Reduce unwarranted political influence in project selection and prioritization
Legislators, by choice and by tradition, have not been involved in project selection, apart
from appropriating transportation funds and limiting their distribution to a 50/50 split between
rural and urban. Legislative input into the process comes through the Area Transportation
Partnerships (ATPs) that decide on federally-funded projects within each district. The Major
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Projects Commission was perceived as one way legislators could influence the project selection
process. This conflicted with the intent of the Commission, which was to (1) review projects
already selected and trim the list of those projects deemed unnecessary; and (2) address the issue
of how major projects could be funded
Unfortunately, Minnesota’s commission increased political influence. The Commission
may have failed because the interests of the legislators involved in the Commission and the
mandate of the Commission were at odds. Legislators viewed the Commission as a means of
getting specific projects funded and constructed.
The state has other institutional practices, however, that limit political involvement.
Officially, the legislature has no formal role in project selection. There are no direct mechanisms
for legislative involvement in developing the 3-Year Construction Plan. Traditionally, the
legislature has not become involved in project selection, primarily due to informal agreement to
that it would keep its hands off the process. If a legislator wanted to get a project funded for
construction, he/she would have to go through regional representatives and the ATP to make the
project a priority. Legislators do not simply add their projects to the finalized State
Transportation Plan recommended by the Transportation Program Investment Committee (TPIC)
and approved by the Commissioner for Transportation.
2. Ensure an emphasis on system maintenance and preservation
Minnesota’s system of decentralized decision-making places a premium on preservation
and may result in underfunding of new capacity projects. In 1997, Mn/DOT began utilizing
performance-based planning. Target performance measures were used to measure pavement
performance, make decisions, and facilitate district planning.
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3. Require meetings at the local or district level to increase communication, trust, and
transparency
Mn/DOT’s planning and project selection process is very decentralized and open to
public input. The selection of projects for funding and construction is bottom-up, driven by
public input through transportation partnerships at the district level for any project affecting its
jurisdiction.
The project selection process begins with districts, Metropolitan Planning Organizations
(MPOs) and Regional Development Commissions (RDCs) initiating the project solicitation
process. Each district, MPO, and RDC then evaluates the solicited projects and compiles a
prioritized list of projects. The District offices and the area transportation partnerships (ATPs)
then take the priority lists from their MPOs and RDCs and integrate them into their respective
Area Transportation Improvement Programs (ATIPs), which are then submitted to the Office of
Investment Management in the form of an integrated list organized by year. These area
transportation partnerships serve as quasi-advisory or coordinating group for various
organizations in its transportation district. ATPs are involved in making decisions regarding
federally-funded projects. Projects funded by non-federal resources are decided by the Mn/DOT
districts.
4. Ensure fair allocation of resources to each region of the state
Minnesota’s methods for distributing funds to the districts provides for geographic equity
and local input. The central Mn/DOT office allocates funding to the districts, which then create
priority lists of their projects given the allocated funding targets. There is much local control
throughout project selection. Local units of government have virtual veto power over every
transportation improvement that touches their jurisdiction. This was originally intended as a
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mechanism to protect local interests, but has instead evolved into a system that allows local
government units with an agenda to hold hostage a major project impacting the entire
surrounding region. Negotiations with a local governmental unit could delay a project for years
and even decades
5. Reduce wasteful expenditures
Project selection is fiscally-constrained based on projected funding targets developed by
the central Mn/DOT office.
6. Ensure sufficient funding to complete projects in an efficient manner
In theory, funding is matched to projects to ensure adequate funding. The Office of
Investment Management (OIM) and the Transportation Program Investment Committee are
responsible for the developing and approving funding targets. These funding targets assist the
districts and ATPs during the process of developing the ATIP and the district in developing,
monitoring, managing, and evaluating the regional portion of the STIP. The Office of Investment
Management is then responsible for developing the final STIP from the ATIPs and regional
STIPs from the ATPs and districts.

6.2.4 Ohio
Since 1994, there have been two major changes in the operation of Ohio Department of
Transportation (ODOT). Both have improved its method of project selection and prioritization.
The first created the Transportation Review Advisory Council or TRAC, which was given the
responsibility of ranking proposed new projects for expanding capacity. TRAC does not choose
preservation and maintenance projects. The second major change was to hand the latter
responsibility to the 12 local ODOT districts.
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New capacity projects are identified in three ways: (1) local proponents bring proposals
to the TRAC through an annual application process; (2) the 12 district offices propose projects
for their regions; or (3) a project may be identified based on the findings of the monitoring
system, which has goals for reducing crashes and congestion and increasing mobility. These
projects are to fit into the state’s long-range transportation plan, dubbed Access Ohio. For TRAC
to accept a project it must also be on the long-range plan of the metropolitan planning
organization (MPO). Accepted projects are then placed on the 6 year plan, after approval by
TRAC.
1. Reduce political intervention in project selection
The creation of TRAC reduced unwarranted political influence in project selection and
prioritization. It made the process more objective by establishing a set of evaluation criteria by
which to judge proposed projects. TRAC receives 50 to 75 applications for new capacity projects
annually. Each proposed project is assessed and given a numerical score from 0 to 130. The
points are allocated to the following TRAC criteria: transportation efficiency (55 points); safety
(15 points); economic development (30 points); public/private/local participation (15 points);
unique multimodal impacts (5 points) and urban revitalization (10 points).
TRAC evaluates and ranks projects, so politicians are not directly involved. The
following quotes from the interviews explain how TRAC operates to reduce the role of politics
in the process. “Before TRAC citizen groups would lobby directly to ODOT. But ODOT did not
have any criteria for ranking or deciding which projects had merit.” In addition, before TRAC,
“gubernatorial candidates used to make promises to build new transportation facilities. Now they
are much less likely to, since they know that TRAC selects the projects. This too has reduced the
role of politics in project selection.” “Political officials (legislators, governors) cannot make
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promises about new roads/bridges. Every thing is visible. Sponsors can see the score, costs, etc.
for their project and other projects. Previously, project decision making was done in a vacuum.
The perception was that those who scream the loudest or have the best political connections will
get their projects funded.”
Politicians can attend the public hearings and voice their support for a specific project,
but in the words of one respondent: “Their support does not make a difference as to whether the
project will be selected” by the TRAC. In prioritizing projects there is said to be no legislative
involvement.
2. Ensure an emphasis on system maintenance and preservation
In 1994, the 12 ODOT district offices were given their own budgets for system
preservation and maintenance. Prior to this the central office controlled all funds. With the new
system, the central office gives each district a system preservation budget based on several
factors such as highway lane miles in the district and the number of bridges. Each district is also
given a set of goals for the overall condition of roads in its district. The district then decides how
the money will be spent to reach these goals. Each district office must prioritize based on
deficiencies and devise a preventive maintenance program. One interviewee informed us that:
“most employees really like having goals set and being evaluated. Makes them feel that they are
really performing.”
The central office monitors the performance of the districts by obtaining measures of
road conditions. In 1999, ODOT instituted goal-based management accountability with an
organizational performance index. Each district must reach 90% of its goals. The ODOT
business plan for road conditions has five strategic initiatives. Every Monday and Friday the
ODOT director receives updates on progress at the district level toward those strategic initiatives.
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Data on system conditions drive systems preservation, with all project selection being criteriadriven.
3. Require meetings at the local or district level to increase communication, trust, and
transparency
Annually, TRAC holds six public hearings around the state beginning in August and
ending in October. A draft project list is published each December. The following officials are
involved in the project selection process: city and county officials, transportation district
officials, MPOs, and central office staff. The first three propose projects, which are scored by the
central office staff using the TRAC criteria. TRAC does not identify projects. Once the
applications are received TRAC prioritizes them based on the pre-determined criteria. TRAC
then publishes the scores of the various projects in local newspapers.
4. Ensure fair allocation of resources to each region of the state
The TRAC scoring system is said to produce a better balance between rural and urban
projects. It is also said to better reflect the population distribution of the state between urban,
rural and suburban areas.
Funding tends to be distributed evenly (a third to each) among rural, urban, and suburban
areas. This is done through the weighting system in the TRAC criteria, primarily the urban/rural
macro corridor.
5. Reduce wasteful expenditures
By reducing political involvement, TRAC also reduced waste in the ODOT labor force.
“Before TRAC, there were three or four times the number of projects in the ODOT pipeline.
TRAC brought a more realistic number of projects and a process that is more objective. ODOT is
no longer wasting resources on projects that will not be built.” ODOT now consistently builds
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the projects it says it will build. The result, respondents say, is that the number of ODOT
employees has dropped from more than 8,000 to less than 6,000, without a large increase in
contracting out.
In regard to spending on system preservation projects, the districts are responsible for
producing the desired preservation outcomes with the funds they are allocated. If they need more
money than allocated they have to justify the additional funds
6. Ensure sufficient funding to complete projects in an efficient manner
While funds are dedicated by the legislature, the legislature does not identify the major
transportation projects to be built. That is entirely up to the TRAC. The allocated funds go to the
planning department for disbursement to projects.
TRAC has reduced overspending and encouraged local governments to assume some of
the costs of projects. One of the criteria for scoring a project is local contribution of funds. “This
requirement has brought about greater levels of local money for capacity improvement projects.”
TRAC imposes funding caps or ceilings on projects and can refuse to authorize additional
funds when a project goes over budget. When local projects go above cost, the district or local
officials must come before TRAC and request additional funds. This forces districts to be more
honest with their cost estimates when they propose new projects. The TRAC does not
automatically approve additional funds for projects that are more than 10% over budget.

6.2.5 Washington
The state of Washington recently made changes in the responsibilities of its commission.
In 2004, the legislature passed a 9.5 cent gas tax increase and changed the governance of
transportation. They divested the commission of the responsibility of appointing the secretary of
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the DOT and its authority to approve the DOT’s budget. However, the commission retains the
responsibility for the 20-year transportation plan and the shorter range investment plan. It also
kept the responsibility for setting transportation performance benchmarks as well as the authority
to set tolls and ferry fares. The Transportation Performance Audit Board (TPAB) was moved
from the auspices of the legislature to the commission. Additional responsibilities were given to
the commission, including a biennial report on the state of transportation, a series of special
studies and rule making authority for a new public-private initiatives program. Finally, the
commission kept the authority to approve funding changes between projects and for bond
authorizations.
Project planning in Washington has both centralized and decentralized features. The
Washington State Department of Transportation (WSDOT) is divided into six regional divisions
and an urban corridor division. Project development and selection for their “nickel program”
began with the regions conducting various needs analyses (including safety and capacity).
Project lists (with the accompanying descriptions/analyses) were then sent to the central office to
create a composite roster. This composite roster was then reviewed by senior professionals in the
WSDOT central office, who rated the projects (based on their experience and knowledge) as A,
B, or C (with the A listed projects being the highest priority and limited to about one-third of the
total projects in terms of projected revenues).
1. Reduce unwarranted political influence in project selection and prioritization
Politics is reduced by giving a role to all the major actors including local authorities.
However, there is a political element in that the legislature now plays a role. The commission
itself now plays less of a role in project selection and program budgeting.
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2. Ensure an emphasis on system maintenance and preservation
The interviews did not provide information on current maintenance policies.
3. Require meetings at the local or district level to increase communication, trust, and
transparency
The Commission engages in public outreach by holding two-day meetings each month.
These are held in the different regions of the state and are open to the public. In addition they are
televised by the state’s public service network, thus providing a highly visible public forum. At
these sessions the WSDOT is held accountable for program performance and project delivery.
4. Ensure fair allocation of resources to each region of the state
WSDOT’s project selection system, as employed for their “nickel program” was a
bottom’s up system in which new projects were proposed by transportation professionals
operating in the regions and in consultation with local authorities about their needs. The
composite state priority list of projects was determined by a mix of professionals in the WSDOT
office and then subjected to review by their commission and the legislature. By all accounts the
reviewing parties endorsed the WSDOT list of projects for funding with only a few exceptions.
Thus, the attempt to bring the transportation professionals and the politicians to agreement on the
most worthy projects was successful, as both championed the funding of the same projects.
5. Reduce wasteful expenditures
There is a significant and growing emphasis on benchmarking performance and
reviewing and auditing the processes and procedures of the WSDOT. The usefulness of the
audits/reviews has been clearly recognized by the DOT. The commission (and previously the
legislature) through the Transportation Performance Audit Board has the responsibility for
performance auditing.
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6. Ensure sufficient funding to complete projects in an efficient manner
WSDOT has established a pro forma budget that has the acceptance of the commission
and the legislature. This provides the department and others with more useful information
regarding the financial condition of the department versus the capital expenditure program
However, the WSDOT (as other DOTs) finds it increasingly difficult to manage the flow of
revenue, project scope or cost creep, and the nearly inevitable time delays associated with public
infrastructure projects. And this leads to both public and political outcries for improved
governance and management, if not charges of government mismanagement. In regard to
program management information, they appreciate the need to keep up with scope, schedule and
budget for all the projects, not just the mega projects. The WSDOT is often asked to explain the
individual project over-runs that adversely impact the total funding available for the program’s
remaining projects.
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Chapter 7: Some Implications for Organizational Changes to Improve DOT
Accountability and Public Trust
This chapter summarizes the findings from the case studies. It also discusses the
implications of our findings for understanding the best way to incorporate a transportation
commission into the transportation decision-making arena. We conclude with a discussion of
implications for building a more accountable set of structures and laws to govern state
transportation decision-making.
7.1 A Summary of Case Study Findings
In public administration accountability is multifaceted and frequently requires trade-offs
between the various facets of accountability. In regard to DOTs, this appears to mean trade-offs
between the political, understood broadly, and the technical. Clearly, as our case studies
revealed, none of the five high performing states based project selection, prioritization, and
funding on technical criteria alone. Accountability to the regions and localities appears to require
structures and rules that guarantee that each region of a state get some projects, even though
some of them may be less worthy from a technical standpoint. This slight lean toward the regions
in project selection appears to have the added benefit of increasing trust.
Each case study illustrated the importance of building transparency and local input into
the project selection process. Even in Ohio, where the commission must follow technical criteria
for project prioritization, there is a great deal of discussion and input at the local level. New
capacity projects are identified in three ways—the first two of which involve local input: (1)
local proponents bring proposals to the TRAC through an annual application process; (2) the 12
district offices propose projects for their regions; or (3) a project may be identified based on the
findings of the monitoring system, which has goals for reducing crashes and congestion and
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increasing mobility. But, TRAC has generated more trust in ODOT on the part of the public and
legislators. As an independent body, TRAC makes ODOT look more credible in its activities and
project selection. This was attributed to the criteria based selection process more than TRAC’s
relative independence. In addition, TRAC is said to give ODOT stability and clout with the
legislature, because the public knows that it is delivering on its promises. The rise in trust was
said to have made it possible for ODOT to ask for and receive an increase in the gas tax. Another
sign of trust is a decline in complaints of unfairness in project selection. In the beginning there
were complaints, but the public has grown to accept TRAC’s decisions.
Unlike Ohio, the commission plays only a small role in project selection in Maryland.
Accountability appears to arise from the openness of the system. Indeed, the overall system of
project selection encourages local participation and public trust. Clearly, the annual Tour of the
Counties and Baltimore City generates transparency as well as public discussion. Accountability
appears to arise from the role of the counties and local officials in the identification of projects. It
appears that public acceptance of project selection is rooted in the role allocated to local officials
and the give-and-take between local officials and the State Highway Administration that occurs
during and after the annual tour. For its part, the SHA advances technical merit and is not
obligated to give the county and local officials all the projects they request. But, merit alone does
not govern project selection and prioritization. Each county and district gets money for projects.
In other words, the system is structured to provide for some, though not all, local desires.
Florida uses its commission to enhance accountability and trust by having the
commission conduct an annual review of FDOT’s tentative 5-year Work Plan. Review of the
work plan ensures that sufficient funds exist to accomplish the projects in the plan. Trust is also
generated by commission members representing the regions of the state, but more so by Florida’s
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bottom-up planning process. The Florida Department of Transportation has established a
decentralized project evaluation and selection process which includes: (1) local (by district) and
state wide (by commission) public hearings; (2) input from MPOs and/or counties; and (3) the
professional expertise and judgment of the district Secretary and his or her staff.
Minnesota also devolves project planning to local districts. The project selection process
begins with districts, Metropolitan Planning Organizations (MPOs) and Regional Development
Commissions (RDCs). Minnesota had a major projects commission but it was terminated,
apparently because it gave legislators too large a role in project selection. Minnesota appears to
treat its regions fairly—by gathering input at the local level and adequately funding system
preservation, but it has yet to solve its need to coordinate projects across jurisdictions.
Washington’s commission appears to be in a state of flux in which it is losing its role in
project selection but acquiring a stronger oversight role in regard to audits. Like the other states,
it has a decentralized selection process in the early stages but then has its central office review
the local plans. Two days each month the commission holds meetings at different locations
around the state. These are public forums that increase transparency and public trust. The
bottom-up approach to project development appears to ensure that each region of the state
receives resources.
7.2 Implications for Adopting a Commission
Our analysis in Chapter 5 suggests that a transportation commission need not be very
powerful to be effective. We observed no connection between the number of powers granted to a
commission and our measure of performance. In fact, there was a negative correlation with one
of the powers—the ability to select or nominate the director of transportation. There was also a
negative association with the policy of requiring commission members to represent specific
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geographic regions of their state. This is probably due to the fact that since state legislators
already represent regions or districts, a requirement that commission members do likewise only
reinforces the inclination to pursue local interests at the expense of the general interest.
We turn now to lessons learned from this study about the proper attributes of a
commission. Table 7.1 summarizes our findings on effective characteristics of commissions.
Our findings suggest the advisability of granting a commission a broad role in policy setting and
oversight. This gives the commission a clear mission to pursue. A commission, as we discussed,
is a fourth party in the complex accountability environment that surrounds a DOT. It shares that
environment with the governor, the legislature, local officials, and the DOT. While it tends to
play only a marginal role in the everyday decision-making of a DOT, its presence seems to
enhance public discussion of transportation issues and lend transparency to the decision-making
process.
Table 7.1: Four Attributes of Effective Commissions
(1) They avoid geographic representation of commissioners
(2) They avoid giving the commission the authority to nominate or select the DOT
Director
(3) They have a clearly stated mission
(4) Their members are citizens, not elected officials

Commissions should be composed of private citizens. The experience of Minnesota is a
cautionary tale in this regard. A majority of its commission members were from its legislature.
Clearly, putting state representatives and senators on a commission is a formula for legislative
meddling in the project selection process.
There are several other principles that can reduce the exercise of narrow political
interests. While they were not associated with improved performance, they seem likely to
generate public trust in the commission and the DOT. These are: (1) requiring a fairly even split
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in the political party affiliations of the commission’s members may be an effective way to
reassure the public that the commission is not pursuing a partisan agenda; (2) giving the
commission a degree of independence from the governor, it may be advisable to stagger the
appointments to the commission, so that a governor is not able to appoint all the members of a
commission in a first term.
In Table 7.2 we present some suggested roles for a transportation commission.
Table 7.2: Suggested Commission Roles and Responsibilities
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)

Policy formulation
Oversight responsibility including performance measurement or program audit
Public meetings in regions of the state as part of the planning process
Public advocate for state’s transportation needs

7.3 Implications for Building a More Accountable Set of Structures and Laws
Commissions contribute in various ways to the performance of their state DOTs; but, as
the interviews of state officials show, the contributions of commissions depend on a variety of
other policy choices and organizational structures. Indeed, the role of a commission will depend
in part on the way a state settles several fundamental issues. First, does it want to take a topdown or bottom-up approach to project selection? If it chooses to decentralize, should it do so by
county, region, or district? Our investigation found examples of each. But, our case studies
suggest that decentralization by region is the best approach for maintenance and preservation
projects.
Decentralizing some DOT decision-making has several advantages. In a given year, the
DOT will fund hundreds of projects. It does not seem feasible to rank all of them against each
other. There are several ways to handle this problem. One, the approach taken by Ohio, involves
ranking only a limited set of projects, e.g., new capacity projects. Ohio leaves the ranking of
maintenance and preservation projects to its districts. Each district gets an overall target for the
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conditions of the state highways in its jurisdiction as well as a budget, but is free to choose the
specific projects it will fund.
For new capacity projects on the other hand, some degree of centralized decision-making
seems necessary. But only after the districts are allowed to suggest projects, which leads to this
question. After obtaining input from the districts, what role will the central office take in
selecting the final set of projects? What role should the commission, the governor and the
legislature have in this final selection? Most states seem to have systems that give each actor a
small role.
A related set of issues concerns the degree of public transparency to afford the process. It
appears that the public hearings in the districts improve transparency and public confidence in
the DOT. This is beneficial. But it then becomes difficult to reject a proposed project without the
use of some objective criteria. The state of Ohio’s TRAC has a set of evaluation criteria that it
uses to rank new capacity projects. The other states have central office review by transportation
professionals, but the criteria are not made public. A state must decide whether or not to make its
decision criteria public and project scoring public knowledge.
7.4 Steps to Improve Accountability
We conclude with a brief discussion of six steps to improve accountability. They relate
the findings from our study to the six dimensions of accountability previously discussed.
Table 7.3: Six Steps to Improve Accountability
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)

Build in techniques for reducing political involvement in project selection.
Hold numerous meetings to increase local participation, transparency and trust.
Empower districts to make decisions for maintenance and system preservation.
Build in formal waste reduction techniques.
Ensure fair allocation of resources and projects.
Ensure sufficient funding to complete projects on time.
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1. Build in techniques for reducing political involvement in project selection.
For example, Ohio’s commission has statutory authority to select new capacity projects.
Florida’s governor has a line item veto. In addition, Florida demands that projects be fully
funded and insists that a new addition to the 5-year work plan be paid for by the deletion of a
project in the same region. These requirements discourage legislative meddling.
2. Hold numerous meetings to increase local participation, transparency and trust.
Maryland, for instance, has its planning officials tour the counties of the state and meet
with local officials to take suggestions for projects. The Washington State Transportation
Commission holds monthly meetings in different locations. Florida’s commission holds meetings
on projects around the state. Such meetings afford public input and render the project selection
process more open.
3. Empower districts to make decisions for maintenance and system preservation.
Washington, Minnesota, Florida, Ohio, and Maryland have districts rank and select
projects. Most DOTs are divided by district and most states measure the quality of their
highways with such yardsticks as the international roughness index (IRI). The availability of
such objective measures makes it possible to devolve decision-making power to the district level.
4. Build in formal waste reduction techniques.
Understandably, the public is opposed to waste in all its forms: redundant employees;
projects not finished in a timely manner; cost overruns; and inadequate maintenance to name
some of the more common manifestations of waste in the area of transportation. It seems
advisable to institutionalize devices to reduce waste. Here are two examples. Ohio asks local
governments to pay for cost over-runs. Florida requires projects to have sufficient funds.
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5. Ensure fair allocation of resources and projects to the regions.
This, or course, is never easy. There is an inevitable conflict between allocating resources
by objective criteria and allocating based on the equity driven desire to distribute resources to
each region. One way to resolve this conflict is to separate maintenance and preservation projects
from new capacity projects. Each region can be assured sufficient resources to reach
maintenance targets. The new projects can then be ranked according to objective criteria.
Another way to ensure rural areas get projects is to make connectivity one of the criteria. Other
things being equal, a proposed project that connects a rural area to a major center or interstate
would have a higher rating.
6. Ensure sufficient funding to complete projects on time.
Many states have problems finishing projects in a timely manner with the result that
delays occur, driving up the ultimate cost of the project. Florida gives its commission the
responsibility of reviewing projects and finances to make sure that each project in the work plan
has sufficient funding. ODOT takes a different approach. It funds maintenance projects first.
Whatever money is left over, it allocates to the projects at the top of its list and stops funding
projects when funds run out. Thus, projects are only begun when the money to finish them is
available.
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Appendix A: Case Studies
A.1 Florida Case Study
Case Study Highlights:
 Florida Department of Transportation policies and activities are monitored and/or
supervised by two oversight bodies: (1) the Florida Transportation Commission and
(2) the FDOT Executive Board.
 The Florida Transportation Commission has independent oversight responsibility of
the DOT. The Commission’s statutory powers include: (1) the review of the
performance of the Florida Department of Transportation; (2) the review the
department’s work plan; and (3) the responsibility to propose three nominees to the
Governor for the Secretary of Transportation.
 The Commission’s roles were clearly intended as a combination of oversight and
policy making rather than project selection. The enacted statutes strictly prohibited
the Commission from involvement in day-to-day Department operations.
 The FDOT utilizes a bottom-up planning process (district to central office to
Commission for certification) to develop Florida’s 5-year Work Program.
 To insure that the Work Program is funded (particularly the first three years of the
five year plan), funding is matched to specific projects, which are then scheduled or
programmed for construction and/or maintenance.
 FDOT’s funding emphasis is on system preservation and maintenance. At least 50%
of funds for the Florida Interstate Highway System funds must be used for
preservation and maintenance.
 The MPOs and counties in non-urbanized areas provide their FDOT districts with
prioritized lists of local projects. Public input regarding the Work Program is
obtained through public hearings hosted by the Florida Transportation Commission.
 The Legislature can add specific earmarked projects to the Work Program but the
cost of such projects have to be offset by reductions in the district where the
legislatively-initiated project resides. The Governor has the power to line-item veto
projects added by the legislature.

A.1.1 Florida Department of Transportation (FDOT)
History and Structure of the FDOT
The Florida Department of Transportation (FDOT) is an executive agency of the Florida state
government whose primary responsibility is “coordinating the planning of a safe, viable, and
balanced state transportation system serving all regions of the state, and to assure the
compatibility of all components, including multimodal facilities” (FS 334.044). The FDOT was
established in 1968, replacing a five member Road Board that had been responsible for
managing Florida’s transportation system since 1915. The Road Board, an influential group
representing five districts in Florida, had replaced the Florida Road Department, the original
Florida department responsible for road development and related issues in the state.
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The FDOT has a central office in Tallahassee and seven district offices located throughout the
state. The central office has four divisions including: (1) the Office of the Secretary; (2) the
Finance and Administration division; (3) the Engineering and Operations division; and (4) the
Intermodal Systems Development. The Office of the Secretary provides legislative, legal,
communications and other support for the department and the Department Secretary. The
Finance and Administration division houses procurement, human resources, information
technology, financial development, financial management and related mission support programs.
Meanwhile, the Engineering and Operations division, the largest division of FDOT, is
responsible for the day-to-day operations of the department. Included in the Engineering and
Operations division are engineering, construction, right-of-way, maintenance and oversight of
the agency’ law enforcement unit. Finally, the Intermodal Systems Development division serves
as the central policy and intergovernmental coordination secretariat. It is responsible for
development of the Florida Transportation Plan, intermodal plans and policies, and grants
management (see Figure A.1.1, the organizational structure of the Florida Department of
Transportation).
Each of the seven Florida DOT district offices is headed by a District Secretary and has major
operating and planning responsibilities consistent with FDOT’s decentralized management and
operational style. While organizational structures vary, the districts have operating divisions that
focus on administration, planning, and production and operations in some form.
Florida Department of Transportation policies and activities are monitored and/or supervised by
two oversight bodies: (1) the Florida Transportation Commission, and (2) the FDOT Executive
Board. The Florida Transportation Commission, which was established in 1987, is a citizens’
oversight board independent of the FDOT and has its own staff. The FDOT Executive Board is
an internal policy-level board that oversees the operations of the Department. The Board includes
the Department Secretary, Assistant Secretaries, District Secretaries, and the Executive Director
of the Turnpike Enterprise. The Executive Board reviews and approves departmental policies
and procedures, commissions significant initiatives, and reviews the overall assessment of the
agency.
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Figure A.1.1: Organizational Chart for the Florida Department of Transportation

Source: Florida Department of Transportation Public Information Office
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A.1.2 Florida Transportation Commission
Commission Origin, Structure and Responsibilities
The Florida Transportation Commission (FTC) was initially created by the Florida
legislature in 1987 as an advisory board for the FDOT, 20 years after the demise of the
Florida Road Board in 1968. In 1989, the FDOT was under increasing criticism for
financial and operational mismanagement. A major part of the criticism resulted from a
cash shortage that stalled $210 million worth of contracts. Other operational issues and
concerns, including the lack of appropriate experience of some of the Department’s
senior administrators fostered a crisis of confidence in the Department.
After the Florida Auditor General raised substantial questions regarding the department’s
activities and operations, the legislature decided to enhance the role and responsibilities
of the Florida Transportation Commission. The legislation changed the Commission’s
responsibilities from advisory to the FDOT to independent oversight of the Department.
The 1989 enacted statute specified three Commission powers including: (1) the review of
the performance of the Florida Department of Transportation; (2) the review the
department’s work plan; and (3) the responsibility to propose three nominees to the
Governor for the Secretary of Transportation. Governor Graham was the first Governor
to name members of the enhanced Commission.
The Florida Transportation Commission has 9 members. Commission members serve
four year terms and are appointed by the Governor and confirmed by the Senate. By state
statute, Commission members must be selected to equitably represent all geographic
areas of the state. Historically, this geographical precedent requirement has been met by
having one commissioner appointed from each of the seven districts supplemented with
two at-large commissioners with rail and port expertise, respectively. The Commissioners
receive no salary and regularly meet about 6 times a year but can meet more if issues
arise that demand their attention.
While the Commission’s responsibilities relating to the selection of a Departmental
Secretary and reviewing the Department’s performance are important, the Commissions
role in enhancing the Department’s credibility through its review of the FDOT’s 5-year
work plan is equally important. Annually, the Commission conducts a Statewide Public
Hearing (to consider questions, suggestions, or comments offered by the public regarding
the work program) and, performs a statutorily-mandated review of the FDOT’s tentative
5-year Work program. The FTC reviews this tentative work program for compliance with
federal and state laws and financial soundness prior to approving and submitting it to the
legislature. As part of the Statewide Public Hearings process, the Commission must, at a
minimum, conduct an in-depth evaluation of work program for compliance with laws and
departmental policies; report findings and recommendations to the legislature and the
Governor; and hear all questions, suggestions, or other comments offered by the public.
The Commission’s evaluation of the work program involves analysis of: (1) financial
soundness; (2) stability; (3) production capacity; (4) accomplishments; (5) compliance
with approved local government comprehensive plans; (6) objections and requested made
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by Metropolitan Planning Organizations; (7) policy changes and effects thereof; (8)
identification of statewide/regional projects; and (9) compliance with other applicable
laws.
The role of the FTC has evolved over time. In the early 1990’s, the Commission’s
immediate major role was to review the performance of the Department in the wake of
the management and credibility concerns of the late 1980s (which, of course, led to its
expanded responsibilities in 1989). Over time, however, the performance assessment role,
which was started in 1991 (after a set of performance measures were identified), has
become more routine as the Department has improved its financial and operational
management processes. As a result, the Commission has refocused its efforts on
transportation and Department advocacy, transportation policy and Department
directional issues while continuing to meet its specific threefold statutory responsibilities.
As its role has evolved, the Commission has tended to take a “holistic” perspective
regarding transportation system needs and is considered, by some, as the “go to guy” for
all modes of transportation in Florida.
It should also be noted that the 1987 and 1989 Florida legislatures were clear that they
wanted the Commission’s roles to be a combination of oversight and policy making
rather than project selection. The clarity of that intent was expressed through their
enacted statutes which prohibited the Commission from involvement in day-to-day
Department operations. These statutes prevented Commission involvement in such
activities as consultant or contractor selection, involvement with specific projects, and
personnel issues.

A.1.3 Project Selection Process
The FDOT utilizes a bottom-up planning process (district to central office to Commission
for certification) to develop Florida’s 5-year Work Program. This bottom-up process is
summarized in Figure B.1.2. The 5-year Work Program specifies details of projects and
services to be undertaken in each of the next five years. The first three years are
considered to be “locked in” so that local governments can coordinate their transportation
planning and development activities with those of the state.
The districts develop draft work programs for their area which includes all transportation
construction and maintenance (including turnpike). While preparing the district plans,
they hold public hearings and receive feedback from local interest groups including the
Metropolitan Planning Organizations (MPOs) in their district. The number of eligible
projects in a district’s work program is determined by estimates of all sources of available
funding. Estimates of state revenues available for allocation to district projects are made
by the state Revenue Estimating Commission (REC). To insure that the work program is
funded (particularly the first three years of the five year plan), funding is matched to
specific projects, which are then scheduled or programmed for construction and/or
maintenance.
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Figure A.1.2: FDOT’s Bottom-up Planning Process
Transportation Commission
Statewide Work Plan is certified
FDOT Central Office

District Work Plans compiled into
Statewide Work Plan

District Work Plans prepared

FDOT Districts

Source: Graphical depiction as understood by the research team.

Affordability guidance in the longer term is provided by the Program and Resource Plan
which encompasses a 10 year allocation of resources by major program area. This
allocation follows the policies and goals contained in the Florida Transportation Plan and
includes consideration of relevant federal and state laws governing the use of
transportation funds. This Program and Resource Plan is developed by the Office of
Financial Development and is supported by a 10-year Financial Plan. The Program and
Resource Plan contains “commitment” authority to fund the full amount of a
transportation project, even if the project will be constructed over multiple years with
cash disbursements stretching beyond the first year of the annual state budget. The Office
of Financial Development estimates future revenues and builds a business plan of
transportation improvements on a cash flowed, commitment basis.
FDOT’s funding emphasis is on system preservation and maintenance. Statutes specify
that at least 50% of funds for the Florida Interstate Highway System funds must be used
for preservation and maintenance. Remaining funds after system preservation and
maintenance needs are addressed can then be used for capacity improvement.
As indicated, project selection occurs involves a cooperative effort between MPOs or
counties (for areas without MPOs) and the FDOT district offices July and January of each
fiscal year. The MPOs and counties in non-urbanized areas provide their FDOT districts
with a prioritized list of local projects. The district office then identifies and reviews
project information, including cost estimates and construction scheduling. The FDOT
districts then develop their respective 5-year Work Programs in conjunction with MPOs
and local governments prior to submission to the FDOT for approval by the Secretary.
Among other responsibilities, the FDOT Secretary is responsible for insuring the
financial viability of the overall plan as part of the approval process and may need to
adjust the district plans to match costs with available revenues. At the local level, the
Work Program must be consistent with the capital improvement elements of the local
governments’ comprehensive plans. Public input regarding the statewide Work Program
is received at public hearings sponsored by the Florida Transportation Commission which
are held in November and December. After the Commission has heard and reviewed the
public comments, it conducts a final review of the 5-year Work Program for compliance
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with federal and state laws. Once this process is completed, the Commission submits the
work program to the Governor and the Legislature.
The first year of the Work Program is included in the Department’s Legislative Budget
Request that is submitted to the Office of the Governor. Following review and approval
of the Governor, the Work Program appropriation recommendations are included in the
Governor’s Budget, which is then submitted to the legislature for final approval through
the transportation appropriation bill.
In addition to the Work Plan and the Program and Resource Plan, the FDOT’s long-range
planning is encompassed by the Florida Transportation Plan. The Florida Transportation
Plan is a 20-year multimodal plan.

The Role of Political Actors
The Commission is responsible for certifying the Work Plan that has been approved by
the Secretary of the Transportation Department, and submitting it, on behalf of the
Department, to the Governor and the Legislature. The Legislature can add specific
earmarked projects to the Work Plan but the cost of such projects have to be offset by
Work Plan reductions in the district where the legislatively-initiated project resides.
Moreover, if legislatively added projects are included in the transportation appropriation
bill, the Governor can line-item veto these projects. The current Governor, Governor
Bush, has vetoed every project that the Legislature has added to the 5-year Work Plan
during his term.

A.1.4 Financial Management and Funding Commitment
The Florida Transportation Commission was established in 1987 and strengthened in
1989, in part, due to concerns regarding the financial management of the Department and
its programs. The mismatch of commitments with available resources created a lack of
credibility and public concern about the ability of the Department to meet its financial
obligations in a timely and equitable manner. As a result the Commission was directed to
insure that the Department’s Work Plan was financially viable and the Commission was
required to certify the Work Plan before it went to the Governor and Legislature. The
review process has, apparently, restored the credibility of the financial management
processes of the Department, improved the working relationship between the KDOT and
local governments and reduced legislative concerns regarding the Department’s
management style and practices. The Commission has also taken on an additional, nonstatutory role. As the initial goals of the Commission were met, the Commission has
taken on the role of “independent public advocate” for the financial needs of the
Department. Overall, the various roles and responsibilities of the Commission appear to
be major positive factors in the improvement of the financial management operations of
the Department in the last decade.
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A.1.5 Other Structural Features that Impact Performance
Workforce Reduction and Organizational Efficiency
A 2001 Operational and Organizational Review of the Florida Department of
Transportation commissioned by the Florida Transportation Commission and conducted
by KPMG found that, in comparison to peer agencies, the FDOT was overstaffed in
several functional and administrative areas. The study’s findings were influential in
decisions to reorganize the Transportation Department and to pursue a privatization and
workforce reduction initiative. Also included was an executive level reorganization
which involved the elimination of some existing Assistant Secretary positions and the
creation of new Assistant Secretary positions consistent with the new organization
structure. Restructuring of departments, functions, and operational responsibilities also
took place.
Based on the privatization and workforce reduction initiative, the FDOT began the
implementation of a 5-year organizational efficiency plan in 2002 to reduce its workforce
by 27%. Including appropriations for 2006, the department has reduced its workforce by
2788 positions over the five year period. The fairly dramatic staff reduction has led to
concern by some staff regarding the capability of certain units in the organization to
effectively carry out their responsibilities.

Private Sector Involvement in FDOT Operations
The same FDOT initiative (the privatization and workforce reduction initiative) has
significantly increased the role of the private sector in KDOT operations. The extent of
its privatization is summarized in Table A.1.1. This extensive use of privatization has
come as a partial result of the department’s workforce reduction, which shifted the work
formerly performed in-house, to external private sector agencies.
Table A.1.1: Extent of Privatization Activity of the Florida Department of
Transportation
Activity
Planning
Design
Construction Engineering Inspection
Construction
Right-of-way Support
Maintenance
Toll Collections

Percent Privatized
74%
83%
81%
100%
73%
80%
99%

Source: Florida Department of Transportation Agency Overview (July 2005).
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A.1.6 Best Practices
Project Selection
The Florida Department of Transportation has established a decentralized project
evaluation and selection process which includes (1) local (by the district) and state wide
(by the Commission) public hearings; (2) input from MPOs and/or counties; and (3) the
professional expertise and judgment of the district Secretary and his or her staff. The
district plans have to be consistent with broader state arterial system needs and
requirements as clarified by Florida’s Strategic Intermodal System (SIS). The districts
proposed Work Plan projects are also subject to funding availability as identified by the
FDOT. The bottoms up planning process insures local input while insuring that broader,
statewide arterial needs of the state are met as indicated by the SIS process.

Accountability
Two factors appear to have played a role in improving the accountability of the FDOT.
These are (1) the creation of the Transportation Commission, and (2) the reorganization
of the Department which clarified roles and responsibilities and, therefore, established
clearer lines of authority and responsibility. As indicated in the previous section on
funding and financial management, the Commission was initially charged with
conducting a performance review of the Department (which has matured to a routine
process due to the improved management of the Department) and the approval or
certification of the Work Plan to insure that it is appropriately funded and meets current
and emerging state needs. The successful completion of both of these goals has created a
system of accountability assessment which could be adapted for other states.

A.1.7 Other Observations Regarding the Florida DOT Commission
As one of the major reasons for the case study of the FDOT was to review and learn from
their experience with its Commission, the following additional observations and
suggestions are offered for other states which might be contemplating the establishment
of a Commission or altering the role of an existing Commission:
 The success that the Florida Commission had in meeting its’ goals appears to
emanate, to a great extent, from its’ initial “clarity of mission.” Its’ roles including
reviewing the Department’s Work Plan, conducting a performance review of the
Department and providing 3 names of nominees for the Department Secretary were
clear and adhered to by the Commission. It was statutorily prevented from becoming
involved in operational issues such as project selection and hiring consultants. These
prohibitions permitted the Secretary and the Department staff to carry out their
responsibilities without day to day involvement of the Commission and permitted the
Commission to provide support to the Department in carrying out it’s responsibilities
without becoming involved in conflicts over operational decisions of the Secretary or
the Department staff.

82








The focus of the Commission on performance assessment and measurement
encouraged the Department to focus on accomplishments and outcomes, and that
focus, in turn appears to have encouraged Departmental innovation and management
improvement.
The Commission, because of its’ independent, broad, statewide view of state
transportation and economic development needs, can be effective in establishing a
forward vision for a state’s transportation system which transcends transportation
modes, interest group views and resistance to change.
The Commission should have a clear and concise set of statutory responsibilities and
activities in order the Commission to focus its activities and effectively work with the
Department.
Finally, the Commission should have a policy rather than an operational focus.
Commission members tend to be selected for their independence and real world view
and understanding of trends and needs. Such input into state transportation system
planning and development processes can produce maximum benefit in the
establishment of policies which insure that the Department is responsive to and
focused on emerging state transportation needs.
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A.2 Maryland Case Study
Case Study Highlights:
 Maryland has two transportation/highway commissions: (1) the Maryland
Transportation Commission – which is an advisory group concerned with
departmental management and operations; and (2) the State Roads Commission –
which has only the power to condemn property for right-of-way purposes.
 Selection and prioritization of capital projects and preservation projects are
performed separately.
 Capital project selection and prioritization involves actors at all levels of
government. Local actors include county and city officials, MPOs and other local
politicians. State Highway Administration (SHA) planners also play a significant
role, especially with respect to technical decisions. The Secretary of Transportation,
the Governor, and the Legislature are also involved in project selection.
 The State Report on Transportation is the major planning document. It contains both
the 20-year (Maryland Transportation Plan) and 6-year (Consolidated Transportation
Plan) plans and is developed by the SHA planning section in draft form and
presented to each of the 23 counties and the city of Baltimore each fall during the
annual tour of the counties.
 The annual tour provides a forum for city and county officials to react to the
proposed plans and if necessary request the addition of other projects. MDOT
officials visit each county to present the proposed program and plan. Following the
fall tour of the counties, the State Report on transportation is prepared in final form
for presentation to the legislature in January.
 The preliminary draft of the CTP is based on projects selected from highway needs
inventory. County and local officials can request additions or removals of projects in
the draft CTP. The Secretary of Transportation has the final say on the projects that
go into the final CTP. The governor and legislature can add and subtract projects to
the CTP. The General Assembly has budget approval of the CTP.

A.2.1 Maryland Department of Transportation (MDOT) and the State Highway
Administration (SHA)
History and Structure of the MDOT and SHA
The Maryland Department of Transportation is responsible for five entities under its
purview. The five are: (1) the State Highway Administration (SHA); (2) the Maryland
Transit Administration (MTA); (3) the Motor Vehicle Administration (MVA); (4) the
Maryland Aviation Administration (MAA); and (5) the Maryland Port Administration.
The Secretary of transportation also has authority over the Maryland Transportation
Authority, which regulates the toll roads. The organizational chart for the MDTO is
presented in Figure A.2.1. The focus of this case study is the activities and
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responsibilities of the State Highway Administration, which is responsible for roadbuilding and system preservation.
Figure A.2.1: Maryland DOT Organizational Chart

Source: Maryland Manual On-line
(http://www.mdarchives.state.md.us/msa/mdmanual/24dot/html/dot.html)

There are 29,265 centerline miles of roadways in the state of Maryland, of which the
SHA maintains 5,243 centerline miles or approximately 18% of the states lane miles. A
full 70% of all vehicle miles of travel are on the state maintained roads.
Of the funds invested in capital projects by the Maryland DOT, 57% are allocated to the
State Highway Administration. The other entities split the remaining 43%, with transit
expenditures accounting for 27% of the programmed expenditures. Capital expenditures
can also be broken down by type: Those for new capital projects (57% of capital
expenditures) and those for system preservation (43% of capital expenditures).
The DOT is headed by the Secretary of Transportation who is appointed by the governor
with the advice and consent of the state senate. The Deputy Secretary, in turn, is chosen
by the Secretary. Each of the major divisions has a chief administrator, appointed by the
Secretary of Transportation with the governor’s approval. There are three main divisions
within the SHA: (1) finance, information technology, and administration; (2) operations,
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and (3) planning and engineering. Figure A.2.2 summarizes the organizational structure
of the SHA.
Figure A.2.2: Organizational Structure of the State Highway Administration

State Highway Administrator

Policy & Research

Communications

State Roads Commission

Equal Opportunity

Finance, Information
Technology, &
Administration

Operations

Planning & Engineering

District Engineers

Bridge Development

Administration
Construction

Environmental Design

Audits
Coordinated Highways Action
Response Team & ITS
Development

Highway Development

Maintenance

Planning & Preliminary
Engineering

Consultant Services

Finance & Information
Technology
Materials & Technology

Real Estate

Traffic & Safety

Source: Organizational chart created by the research team from information in the Maryland Manual
Online

SHA Office of Planning and Preliminary Engineering
The Office of Planning and Preliminary Engineering is within the SHA’s division for
Planning and Engineering. This office coordinates transportation planning statewide and
performs project planning activities. It prepares the six year funding program known as
the Consolidated Transportation Program (CTP). The office is organized into four
divisions: (1) the Highway Information Services Division (HISD); (2) the Program
Development Division (PDD); (3) the Regional and Intermodal Planning Division
(RIPD); and (4) the Project Planning Division (PPD).
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All divisions, with the exception of the HISD, are involved in highway planning. The
highway information services division maintains databases and is not directly involved in
planning. The program development division coordinates and produces SHA’s portion of
the CTP. It also plays a role in preparing for the annual CTP tour of the counties in which
SHA officials present the draft CTP to local governments and officials.
The regional and intermodal planning division is responsible for long range systems
planning and the integration of SHA’s program with regional and local transportation
plans. RIPD prepares briefing packages for the annual Consolidated Transportation
Program (CTP) Tour that visits each county and Baltimore City to meet with local
officials. It also tracks the follow-up assignments and changes in the CTP generated at
Tour meetings. There are six regional teams based on geography. Each team is
responsible for long range planning for their areas and works with MPOs, counties, and
local governments. In addition, the regional planning teams assist in the preparation of
the Highway Needs Inventory (HNI), which is SHA’s long-term, financially
unconstrained planning document that serves as a source document of the CTP.
The project planning division (PPD) has the lead responsibility for the project production
activities necessary for obtaining federal and state agency approvals. The division
performs preliminary engineering.
In short, planning activities are primarily carried out by these two divisions in the SHA:
(1) the Program Development Division; and (2) the Regional and Intermodal Planning
division.

A.2.2 Maryland Transportation Commission and State Roads Commission
Commission Structure and Responsibilities
Maryland has two commissions: the Maryland Transportation Commission (MTC) and
the State Roads Commission. The former was created in 1971 for the purpose of (1)
studying the state’s entire transportation system; and (2) advising the Secretary of
Transportation and Department heads on transportation policy and program execution.
By statute the Maryland Transportation Commission it is authorized to regularly discuss
any matter relating to the state’s transportation system with the Secretary. The statute
empowers the MTC to request of the Secretary any information relating to MDOT that is
needed for the Commission’s studies, surveys, and deliberations. The Maryland
Transportation Commission has 17 members, 10 of whom are appointed directly to it by
the governor (with staggered 3-year terms) and 7 of whom are ex-officio members from
the State Roads Commission.
The Maryland Transportation Commission has very limited powers. Its main job is to put
names and numbers on roads. It is said to look at recommendations, hear presentations,
and make recommendations but to possess no real power. One respondent described the
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MTC as an advisory group to the Secretary that is concerned with how the department is
running.
The State Roads Commission was originally created in 1908 to construct, improve, and
maintain a state system of roads and highways. The Commission consists of eight
members. Seven are appointed to five-year terms by the Secretary of Transportation with
the governor’s approval. Serving part-time, they are appointed from seven geographic
areas. The State Highway Administrator is the commission’s chair.
Over time the State Roads Commission has lost most of its responsibilities. In 1971, the
Maryland Department of Transportation was created and the State Roads Commission
became part of MDOT. Most of the State Roads Commission’s responsibilities were
assumed by the newly created State Highway Administration (SHA). According to the
Deputy Director of Real Estate and Right of Way (within the Office of Real Estate), the
state roads commission has only one power: the ability to condemn property. It has no
role in project selection. Before 1971, however, the road commission handled all
spending for projects. After MDOT was created in its present form in 1971, the approval
of projects was transferred to MDOT. The only influence the State Roads Commission
has on the budget is to estimate right of way costs for land acquisition. However, the
seven members of the state Roads Commission serve on the Maryland Transportation
Commission and are authorized to conduct a survey of the secondary roads in each
member’s district and report on the highway needs and problems of that particular district
to the Maryland Transportation Commission.

A.2.3 Project Selection Process
Actors and Decision Criteria
Capital project selection in Maryland is a complex process in which actors at all levels of
government are able to participate. During the interviews, the respondents mentioned
actors at the local level including county and city officials, MPOs, and other local
politicians. They also described a significant role for the planners in the SHA. In
addition, the Secretary of Transportation, the governor and the legislature are involved in
project selection. The process can be said to have political as well as technical aspects.
Like most states, Maryland has a long-term, 20-year plan (the Maryland Transportation
Plan) and a short term, 6-year plan (the Consolidated Transportation Program). Both of
these are contained in the State Report on Transportation, which is prepared annually.
Maryland also compiles a highway needs inventory (HNI), which is described as a
technical reference and planning document that identifies highway improvements to serve
existing and projected population and economic activity as well as to address safety and
structural problems that warrant major construction or reconstruction. The project needs
identified in the HNI are based on technical analysis. But, not every project on the HNI
will make it onto the Consolidated Transportation Plan for construction.
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The HNI is compiled by regional planners in the Regional and Intermodal Planning
Division in consultation with the District Engineers. Placement on the HNI is based on
several factors, including: (1) safety problems; (2) service deficiencies based on traffic
growth (e.g., service levels of E or F); (3) severe structural deterioration or inadequacy;
(4) economic development; or (5) local and regional master plans.
The HNI lists only major capital construction projects that entail a significant increase in
traffic capacity, extensive right-of-way, high cost or major impact. Low cost capital
improvements for system preservation projects such as resurfacing, safety, and spot
improvements, drainage and the like are not included in the HNI. However, these smaller
projects are included in the annual update to the CTP.
The CTP is the state’s 6-year capital budget for transportation projects. It contains
detailed listings and descriptions of capital projects for the next six year period.
The State Report on Transportation, which contains both the 20-year and 6-year
documents, is developed by the planning section in the SHA in draft form and presented
to each of the 23 counties and the city of Baltimore each fall during the annual tour of the
counties. The county officials can react to it and request the addition of other projects.
MDOT officials visit each county to present the proposed program and plan. Following
the fall tour of the counties, the State Report on transportation is prepared in final form
for presentation to the General Assembly, the legislature in January.

Steps in the Project Selection Process
SHA’s Office of Planning and Engineering (specifically the Program Development
Division) is responsible for selecting the highway projects for the CTP. But many other
actors have a voice in the selection process. The highway planning process begins with
the annual updates to the HNI, which serves as the basis for setting priorities for major
capital improvement projects for inclusion in the CTP. Before the tour of the counties and
Baltimore City, planning staff select projects for the preliminary draft of the CTP from
the highway needs inventory (HNI). After the tour of the counties and consultation with
local officials, other projects may be added to or removed from the CTP. The Secretary
of Transportation is said to have the final say on the projects that go into the final CTP
draft. Then the proposed CTP goes to the governor for his/her approval. The governor
can add and subtract projects to the CTP. With the governor’s approval, the CTP then
goes to the general assembly for budget approval.

Pavement Preservation
Pavement preservation projects are selected through a different process than major capital
construction projects. Pavement management planning is conducted centrally within the
Pavement Division of the Office of Materials and Technology (OMT) with funding and
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project selection approved through the Office of the Chief Engineer (OCE). The seven
engineering districts recommend projects to be considered in the annual system
preservation program and manage construction and maintenance operations within their
districts.
Maryland has adopted a two-step optimization approach to pavement preservation. The
first step entails the development of strategies of investment to reach defined objectives,
such as maximizing condition. This step in the process would identify an objective (e.g.,
resurfacing 120 lane miles of pavement currently classified as fair.) The second step is
performed by the seven districts, which are given the responsibility of identifying the
particular miles to be resurfaced. Computer programs have been developed for each step.
Each year the local district sends a letter to the planning office with their list of priorities.
There is a formula for how much money goes into system preservation.

A.2.4 Financial Management and Funding Commitments
All MDOT activities, including debt service, maintenance, operations, administration and
capital projects, are supported by the Transportation Trust Fund, which is an integrated
account combining revenues from motor fuel taxes (23.5 cents per gallon), the motor
vehicle excise tax, registration and licensing fees, a share of the corporate income tax (24
% of the 7 % corporate income tax), and federal aid.
The Transportation Trust fund is dedicated to MDOT and the allocation of funds for
projects and programs is made in conjunction with state and local elected officials. None
of the trust funds are earmarked.
The Trust Fund was established in 1971 and is separate from the general fund. If MDOT
does not spend the entire fund in a given year it gets to keep the remaining funds.
Regarding borrowing, bonds are approximately 5% of revenues per year. MDOT must
pay the debt service before operating costs, which are about $3 billion per year. There are
several restrictions on debt: (1) a cap on bonds outstanding; and (2) a requirement that
MDOT maintain a 2 times coverage ratio of bonds. The bulk of funds are spent on
highways, transit, air and sea ports.
There is also a cap on the amount of bonds that MDOT can issue. The current limit is $2
billion though this number can increase as taxes increase.
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A.2.5 Other Structural Features that Affect Performance
Responsiveness of the Project Selection Process to Local and Political Pressure
The selection and prioritization of projects can be described as both centralized and
decentralized. According to respondents, the counties identify projects they want
constructed in official letters that are submitted annually to the Office of Planning and
Engineering at SHA. Planning and Engineering then considers the counties’ suggested
projects as well as those on the HNI before producing a list of projects that are
subsequently submitted to the Secretary of MDOT and the legislature. But the secretary,
the legislature, and the governor can also add a project to the list. So, ultimately, the
governor, legislature, and the secretary of transportation decide what is in the CTP. In the
words of one respondent: “If there are deals to be made then they are made at the higher
level—not in the planning department.”
Planning and engineering uses technical criteria. But there is no official
scoring/evaluation system in the planning office. Planning and Engineering staff work
with MPOs, MDOT, and the counties and brainstorms about what the needs of the state
are and how much funding is available. Planning and engineering will have its own list of
potential projects and will match it with the counties’ lists during the tour of the counties.
Feasibility studies are conducted to see if the problems described by the counties warrant
a project.

Reducing the Influence of Politics
Politics is involved to some extent, as elected officials from all levels of government are
involved in transportation planning in various ways. Still there are aspects of the process
that reduce the influence of politics. While the SHA will try to accommodate the counties
as much as possible, SHA is said to not be obligated to do the projects proposed in the
letters from the counties.
Planners from SHA will do preliminary studies if the county says it has a transportation
problem. However, if the preplanning study says there is no problem, the project will not
get placed on the CTP. Thus, engineering criteria are said to enter the evaluation of all
proposed projects.
The Planning and Engineering Office will allocate money to all the counties, assuming
that all counties have a need for funds. However, the more populated regions get more
money. In the opinion of one informant, if planning were to use totally objective
standards then some counties would get nothing. So there is some political influence
insofar as projects must be distributed throughout the counties and regions.
Legislators are said to play a minor role in the process. One respondent said: “If a
legislator wanted a project and it was not on the county list, then it is unlikely that the
project will make it on to the CTP.” But the legislature does approve the CTP. And the
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same respondent noted that legislators have recently removed projects from the CTP and
taken the money for other projects not originally on the list of projects
The MDOT Secretary enters the project selection process for another reason. Most of the
planners are concerned with highways and tend not to consider projects for the airports
and seaports. The Secretary is responsible for putting in projects for the non highway
areas of transportation to balance the state’s priorities.

A.2.6 Best Practices
Accountability, Public Acceptance and Credibility
With its complex system for identifying and selecting projects, accountability appears to
arise from the role of the counties and local officials in the identification of projects. The
SHA must respond to the request of local officials, but it is not obligated to give the
county and local officials the projects they want. For its part the SHA uses objective
criteria to assess the merit of proposed projects and to evaluate the projects it places on
the HNI. But, merit alone does not govern project selection and prioritization. Each
county and district gets money for projects. In other words the system is responsive to
local desires. The annual Tour of the counties and Baltimore City generates transparency
as well as public discussion. In that sense, Maryland has an element of accountability as
well as political influence built into its project selection and prioritization process.
Politics is present also in the powers allocated to the governor, MDOT secretary, and the
legislature. They can add and subtract projects and shift funds from highway projects to
transit and ports. Maryland, it should be noted, devotes a substantial share of its
transportation funding to transit facilities and ports.
The Maryland Transportation Commission appears to contribute little to this process, but
given the substantial powers of the Secretary, legislature and the Governor it may
contribute to the public confidence in their decisions. It appears also that public
acceptance of project selection is rooted in the role allocated to local officials and the
give-and-take between local officials and the SHA that occurs during and after the annual
tour.
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A.3 Minnesota Case Study
Case Study Highlights:
 The Minnesota Major Transportation Projects Commission was created by the
legislature in 2000 and terminated in 2002. The Commission was focused on major
projects, defined as multimillion dollar projects that constitute more than 25% of a
district’s annual construction budget. Its goal was to (1) review major projects; (2)
cut those it considers unnecessary, and (3) rank remaining projects for submission to
the governor and legislature. The Commission comprised primarily of legislators.
 The primary reason for Commission’s demise was its lack of purpose and activity.
The Commission had no formal power and its authorizing mandate did not clearly
specify meaningful actions. The Commission has been characterized by some as
being self-serving, with legislators having pet projects that needed funding expressing
interest in serving on the Commission. The size of the Commission (20 members)
bogged it down.
 Mn/DOT’s transportation planning process is very bottom-up with the districts and
Area Transportation Partnerships playing an important and early role in defining
projects. However, the central Mn/DOT office has final say on which projects will
ultimately be constructed.
 Officially, the legislature has no formal role in project selection. There are no direct
mechanisms for legislative involvement in developing the 3-Year Construction Plan.
However, the legislature can impact the project outcomes for the construction plan by
setting spending limits (i.e. controlling appropriations outcomes) and restricting
funding.
 The Major Projects Commission was perceived as one way through which legislators
could influence the project selection process. This conflicted with the intent of the
Commission, which was to (1) review projects already selected and trim the list of
those projects deemed unnecessary; and (2) address the issue of how major projects
could be funded. The Commission may have failed because the interests of the
legislators involved in the Commission and the Commission’s purpose were at odds.

A.3.1 Minnesota Department of Transportation (Mn/DOT)
History and Structure of the Minnesota Department of Transportation
The state of Minnesota first participated directly in road development with the creation of
the State Highway Commission in 1905. This Highway Commission was abolished in
1917 with the Minnesota legislature creating the Department of Highways.
Constitutional amendments in the 1920s created a trunk highway system and dedicated
gas taxes for the building and maintenance of public roads, which greatly increased the
Department’s resources and responsibilities. Subsequent legislation gave the Department
a broad-based mandate to develop the state’s road system. Legislative mandates included
the authority to acquire right-of-way; locate, construct, reconstruct, improve, and
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maintain the trunk highways; let necessary contracts; buy needed materials and
equipments; and expend necessary funds.
The 1930s and 1940s saw growth in railroads and aeronautics in the state. Following the
1944 Federal Aid Highway Act that authorized funding to improve secondary urban and
rural roads, the State Aid Division was created in 1945 as an addition to the Department
of Highways. This Division’s role was to work with Minnesota cities and counties.
Following a national trend to merge all sate transportation programs and activities in one
department, the Minnesota Department of Transportation (Mn/DOT) was created in 1976
by the Minnesota legislature. The new department absorbed the Departments of
Aeronautics, the Department of Highways, and the transportation-related divisions of the
State Planning Agency and of the Public Service Department. In creating the Department
of Transportation, the legislature established Mn/DOT as the principal agency to develop,
implement, administer, consolidate, and coordinate state transportation policies, plans
and programs.
Minnesota statutes (Chapter 174) defines the Mn/DOT as the agency that develops,
implements, administers, consolidates, and coordinates policies, plans, and programs for
a statewide transportation system that includes highways, aeronautics, motor carriers,
ports, public transit and railroads.
Mn/DOT is structured around 5 divisions: (1) program management; (2) engineering
services; (3) operations, safety and technology; (4) state aid for local transportation
(SALT); (5) district operations. Program management encompasses activities related to
statewide transportation investment and modal operations. Engineering services provides
engineering guidance, standards, raining, and expertise to support the districts in
delivering projects and managing roads. The operations, safety and technology division
oversees the use of technology to promote and enhance transportation safety and
operations. SALT administers the distribution of federal-aid funds, authorizes grants for
bridge construction on local road systems and provides technical assistance for the stateaid and federal-aid road systems. Mn/DOT operations is divided into 8 transportation
districts statewide under the supervision of the districts operations division. The districts
are responsible for construction programming, planning, designing, constructing, and
maintaining state highways. Each district is headed by a transportation district engineer
who leads the development of the transportation system in his region while coordinating
those efforts with the other districts and the Mn/DOT central office. The organizational
chart for the Minnesota Department of Transportation is presented in Figure A.3.1.
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Figure A.3.1: Mn/DOT Organizational Chart

Source: Mn/DOT website (http://www.dot.state.mn.us/information/orgchart.html)
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A.3.2 Major Projects Commission
Commission Structure and Responsibilities
The Minnesota Major Transportation Projects Commission was created by the Minnesota
legislature in 2000. The Commission was proposed by the legislature’s Transportation
Committee Chair, at a time when there was a high degree of frustration with the financial
challenges facing the state’s transportation system. Two factors contributed to this
frustration and dissatisfaction. First, the state was facing a major financial challenge as it
sought funding for the rehabilitation of “budget buster bridge” projects. Many bridges in
the state needed major work, requiring significant funding. However, such funding needs
for these bridges would consume most of a district’s funding allocations, with little
remaining for system preservation and other non-bridge needs. The Major Projects
Commission was created in part to address how Mn/DOT would fund such major and
budget-busting projects. The second concern of the legislature focused on funding for
other major non-bridge infrastructure construction needs. Partly due to the state’s method
of distributing funds to the district to ensure geographic equity and local input, the state
had been forced to resort to incremental construction of major projects – building projects
in several small stages over many years – which resulted in substantial increases in the
overall costs of the projects.
The Commission was supposed to focus its attention on major project funding and related
issues on those multimillion dollar projects that constitute more than 25% of a district’s
annual construction budget. The Commission’s role was to review these major projects,
eliminate proposed projects that it considered unnecessary, and rank the remaining
projects for consideration by the governor and legislature. Membership in the
Commission included the Commissioner of Transportation, 14 legislators – 7 senators
and 7 representatives – and 5 private citizens appointed by the governor, one of whom
was designated as a representative of the governor.
The Major Projects Commission had a short life as it was terminated by the legislature in
2002. The primary reason for the termination of the Commission was its inactivity
resulting from its lack of formal powers. With twenty members, the Commission was
also very large. Some of the Commission’s members, primarily comprised of Senate and
House members, were characterized as being “self-serving.” Such members focused more
on “pet projects” than the broader goals of the Commission. As a result, the Commission
got bogged down and was unable to meet its original objectives.

A.3.3 Planning and Project Selection Process
Mn/DOT employs three planning horizons including the shorter term which is for 3
years, a 10-year Work Plan, and a long-range plan that spans 23 years. The Mn/DOT
planning process is decentralized and open to public input. The selection of projects for
funding and construction is bottom-up, driven by public input through transportation
partnerships at the district level. Project selection is also fiscally-constrained based on
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projected funding targets developed by the central Mn/DOT office. Each district
identifies its needs to meet its performance targets. Given these needs, the district then
prioritizes its projects according to available funding, first emphasizing preservation of
bridges and highways. This emphasis on system preservation, combined with limited
funding, caused many needed capital projects to disappear from the projects list.
Mn/DOT’s planning and project selection process is very decentralized and open to
public input. The selection of projects for funding and construction is bottom-up, driven
by public input through transportation partnerships at the district level. Project selection
is also fiscally-constrained based on projected funding targets developed by the central
Mn/DOT office.
The project selection process begins with districts, Metropolitan Planning Organizations
(MPOs) and Regional Development Commissions (RDCs) initiating the project
solicitation process. Each district, MPO, and RDC then evaluates the solicited projects
and compiles a prioritized list of projects. The District offices and the area transportation
partnerships (ATPs) then take the priority lists from their MPOs and RDCs and integrate
them into their respective Area Transportation Improvement Programs (ATIPs), which
are then submitted to the Office of Investment Management in the form of an integrated
list organized by year. These area transportation partnerships serve as quasi-advisory or
coordinating group for various organizations in its transportation district. Districts and
ATPs have the primary responsibility of bringing together transportation improvement
recommendations of Mn/DOT and its transportation partners. ATPs are involved in
making decisions regarding federally-funded projects. Projects funded by non-federal
resources are decided by the Mn/DOT districts.
The Office of Investment Management (OIM) and the Transportation Program
Investment Committee (TPIC) are responsible for the developing and approving funding
targets. These funding targets assist the districts and ATPs during the process of
developing the ATIP and the district in developing, monitoring, managing, and
evaluating the regional portion of the STIP. The Office of Investment Management is
then responsible for developing the final STIP from the ATIPs and regional STIPs from
the ATPs and districts.
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Figure A.3.2: Simplified Diagrammatic Explanation of Minnesota’s Transportation
Project Selection Process
NON-FEDERAL
MONIES
Mn/DOT Districts
District-level planning
- solicit and evaluate
projects

FEDERAL MONIES
MPOs and RDCs
- solicit and evaluate
projects

Prioritized project list

ATPs
- integrate priority needs

Central Mn/DOT Office
- Target funding
- Transportation
investment goals

Regional STIP

ATIPs

STATE TRANSPORTATION PROGRAM (STP)
- Recommended by the TPIC
- Approved by the Commissioner of Transportation
Source: Created by the research team from information collected during interviews

Mn/DOT’s transportation planning process appears to be very bottom-up with the
districts and ATPs playing an important and early role in defining those projects to be
programmed for construction. However, the central Mn/DOT office has final say on
which projects will ultimately be constructed.

The Role of Political Actors
Officially, the legislature has no formal role in project selection. There are no direct
mechanisms for legislative involvement in developing the 3-Year Construction Plan.
However, the legislature can impact the project outcomes for the construction plan by
setting spending limits (i.e. controlling appropriations outcomes) and restricting funding
such that there is a 50/50 split between rural and urban areas of the state. Traditionally,
the legislature has not become involved in project selection, primarily due to informal
agreement to that it would be hands-off the process. If a legislator wanted to get a project
funded for construction, he/she would go through regional representatives and the ATP to
make the project a priority. Legislators do not simply add their projects to the finalized
STP recommended by the TPIC and approved by the Commissioner for Transportation.
From a budgeting perspective, the legislature has a long history of not including specific
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transportation projects in the budget. Legislators have been more focused on the revenue
side of the budget. The Senate was traditionally opposed to tying the budget to specific
projects because there is the assumption that the Mn/DOT is making good decisions.

A.3.4 Transportation Finance
In 1956, Minnesota voters approved a constitutional amendment providing for the
distribution of state road user funds with 62% going to the state, 29% to the county, and
9% to the municipality.
Over the last twenty years, Minnesota has seen much monetary resources being diverted
away from transportation. The state’s gas tax was last raised in 1988 by 20 cents per
gallon. In 1988/1989, a percentage of the motor vehicle sales tax was dedicated to the
Trunk Fund, but this has not yet occurred to date. The vehicle registration fee was
reduced in 2001, and the 2005 Transportation Bill was vetoed by the Governor because it
included an increase in the gas tax.

A.3.5 Other Structural Features that Affect Performance
Overly Powerful Local Governments
Transportation project selection in Minnesota is very decentralized and the process is
bottom-up, driven by the highway districts and the local MPOs and RDCs. The central
Mn/DOT office allocates funding to the districts, which then create priority lists of their
projects given the allocated funding targets. As such, the local governments are dominant
and powerful players in the project selection process.
Local units of government have virtual veto power over every transportation
improvement that touches their jurisdiction. This was originally intended as a mechanism
to protect local interests, but has instead evolved into a system that allows local
government units with an agenda to hold hostage a major project impacting the entire
surrounding region. For example, local governments can veto any transportation project
affecting their jurisdiction and must provide their consent for any tolling practices within
their jurisdiction. Mn/DOT has also recently pursued the use tolling to finance
transportation infrastructure improvement. However, the use of toll roads requires
municipal consent, and municipalities have resisted the implementation of tolling
projects.
Negotiations between the central Mn/DOT (or the state) and local governmental units can
consume significant resources and may delay a project for years and even decades. As a
result, having overly powerful local governments may decrease the effectiveness of the
state’s transportation planning and negatively affect the DOT’s performance.
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Informal Tradition of Political Uninvolvement
Legislators, by choice and by tradition, have not been involved in project selection, apart
from appropriating transportation funds and limiting its distribution to a 50/50 split
between rural and urban. Legislative input into the process comes through the Area
Transportation Partnerships that decide on federally-funded projects within each district.
Given that legislators have the opportunity to become involved in the planning and
project selection process at the district level, Minnesota has been able to avoid political
involvement in the state’s planning process during legislative sessions, leading to greater
stability and consistency in the overall planning process.

Performance-Based Planning
In 1997, Mn/DOT began utilizing performance-based planning. Target performance
measures were used to measure pavement performance, make decisions, and facilitate
district planning. With this performance-based planning, Mn/DOT made the switch from
standards-based need to performance-based needs.

A.3.6 Best Practices and Lessons Learned
Project Selection that is Locally-Driven
The Minnesota project selection is decentralized and can be described as a bottom-up
process. The process for development of planning documents and project plans provide
for significant public and interest group (including MPOs and RDCs) participation early
in the process. This planning and project selection model reduces incentives for local
groups to intervene later in the project approval process via the state legislature. The
success of this process design is evidenced by the tradition and culture of the Minnesota
legislature to avoid involvement in the project selection process (except for the recent,
but unsuccessful, effort to become involved through the Major Projects Commission
which was created and terminated within two years).

Create Balance of Power between State and Local Governmental Units
Local governments hold the majority of the power with regards to transportation in
Minnesota. Planning and project selection is driven by local needs and local actors. In
addition, local governments have veto power over any transportation project affecting
their jurisdiction. The latter has shifted the balance of power towards local government,
putting the central Mn/DOT office at the mercy of local governments. This has caused
transportation planning in Minnesota to focus primarily on district system preservation, to
the neglect of broader, statewide capital improvement projects.
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Reduce Legislature Involvement in the Transportation Commission to Reduce
Conflicts of Interest
Minnesota’s Major Projects Commission was created to: (1) review projects already
selected and trim those projects deemed unnecessary; and (2) address the issue of how
major projects could be funded. One of the primary reasons for the failure of the
Minnesota Major Transportation Projects Commission appears to be that the Commission
was dominated by legislators. The interests of the legislators involved in the Commission
and the mandate of the Commission were at odds. Apparently, some legislators viewed
the Commission as means of getting specific projects funded and constructed. These
legislators approached membership in the commission as a means of pursuing their own
agenda. As such, the Commission’s purpose and goals took a backseat as the legislators
used the Commission to focus on their “pet projects.”
This conflicted with the culture of the Minnesota legislature which was, and continues to
be, one of “hands off” when it comes to transportation project selection. As a
consequence, the role of the Commission was unclear and the majority of the Minnesota
legislature felt that it did not add to the planning and project selection process and
decided to terminate the Commission after two years.
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A.4 Ohio Case Study
Case Study Highlights:
 Since 1994, there have been two major changes in ODOT operation of ODOT that
have improved its method of project prioritization and selection: (1) changes to the
system for preservation and maintenance; and (2) creation of a commission-like
structure for the selection of major new capacity projects.
 Transportation Review Advisory Council (TRAC) as the commission-like entity
responsible for project prioritization and selection of new capacity expanding
projects.
 Responsibility for selection and prioritization of preservation projects resides with the
highway districts.
 TRAC is allocated funds for major, new capacity projects after funds for system
preservation have been determined. A major new project defined as one that will cost
at least $5 million and will do one or more of the following—reduce congestion,
increase mobility, provide connectivity, or increase economic development.
 TRAC projects are assessed using on a numerical score from 0 to 130, based on the
following criteria: (1) transportation efficiency; (2) safety; (3) economic
development; (4) public/private/local participation; (5) unique multimodal impacts;
and (6) urban revitalization.
 TRAC has changed the dynamics of project selection. It has provided ODOT with a
means for ranking or deciding on projects. TRAC has also reduced the ability of
elected official to make promises regarding transportation projects.
 The biggest impact of TRAC has been the increased transparency of the project
selection process. Numerical scores and costs for all proposed projects are made
public so project sponsors, elected and appointed officials, and members of the public
can compare the merits of different projects.

A.4.1 Ohio Department of Transportation (ODOT)
Structure and Leadership of ODOT
The Ohio Department of Transportation is headed by a Director of Transportation and
two assistant directors—one for planning and production and the other for highway
management. ODOT also has district deputy directors who oversee operations in 12
districts. The assistant director of planning and production is in charge of the following
divisions: (1) planning; (2) local programs; (3) production management; (4) finance; and
(5) forecasting. The assistant director of highway management is responsible for these
divisions: (1) contract administration; (2) construction management; (3) highway
operations; and (4) facilities and equipment management. All twelve district deputy
directors report to both of the assistant directors. The organizational chart for the Ohio
DOT is presented in Figure A.4.1.
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Figure A.4.1: Ohio Department of Transportation Organizational Chart

Source: Ohio Department of Transportation Website (http://www.dot.state.oh.us/)

Transportation planning in Ohio involves four types of plans: (1) a 30-year long-range
plan; (2) a 15-year plan; (3) a 6-year capital plan approved by the TRAC; and (4) a 2-year
strategic initiatives and business plans.
Since 1994, there have been two major changes in the operation of ODOT, which have
improved its method of project prioritization and selection. The first reformed the
operation of its system for preservation and maintenance. The second institutionalized a
commission-like structure for the selection of major new capacity projects.

Reforming Pavement Preservation
In 1994, the 12 district offices were given their own budgets for system preservation and
maintenance. Prior to this the central ODOT office controlled all funds. The central office
gives each district a system preservation budget based on several factors such as lane
miles in the district and the number of bridges. Each district is also given a set of goals
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for the overall condition of roads in its district. The district then decides how the money
will be spent to reach the goals. Each district office must prioritize based on deficiencies
and devise a preventive maintenance program. One interviewee informed us that: “most
employees really like have goals set and being evaluated. Makes them feel that they are
really performing.”
The central office monitors the performance of the districts by obtaining measures of
road conditions. In 1999, ODOT instituted goal-based management accountability with
the organizational performance index. Each district must reach 90% of its goals. The
ODOT business plan for road conditions has five strategic initiatives. Every Monday and
Friday the ODOT director receives updates on progress at the district level toward those
strategic initiatives. Data on system conditions drive systems preservation, with all
project selection being criteria-driven.
The districts are responsible for producing the desired preservation outcomes with the
funds they are allocated. If they need more money than allocated they have to justify the
additional funds
The second major reform was the creation of the Transportation Review Advisory
Council, which is referred to as TRAC. It will be described in the next section.

A.4.2 Transportation Review Advisory Council (TRAC)
Commission Structure and Responsibilities
Project prioritization and selection of new capacity expanding projects in Ohio is done by
the Transportation Review Advisory Council, which is referred to as TRAC. The TRAC
does not select preservation projects. As described above, that responsibility is held by
the highway districts.
The TRAC was created by the Ohio General Assembly in 1997 and is composed of the
director of ODOT and eight appointees, who are chosen for their experience in the areas
of transportation, business, or economic development. The governor appoints six
members and the president of the Ohio Senate and the speaker of the Ohio House each
name one member. Commission members have staggered terms, so not all members are
appointed at the same time.
TRAC is allocated funds for major, new capacity projects after funds for system
preservation have been determined. A major new project is defined as one that will cost
at least $5 million and will do one or more of the following—reduce congestion, increase
mobility, provide connectivity, or increase economic development. Historically, TRAC
has had about $300 million each year to pay for projects, including design, right of way
and construction. This is about 20% of overall construction expenditures—the rest going
to system preservation.
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A.4.3 Project Selection Process
Actors and Decision Criteria
New capacity projects are identified in three ways: (1) local proponents bring proposals
to the TRAC through an annual application process; (2) the 12 district offices propose
projects for their regions; or (3) a project may be identified based on the findings of the
monitoring system, which has goals for reducing crashes and congestion and increasing
mobility. These are to fit into the long-range transportation plan, dubbed Access Ohio.
For TRAC to accept a project it must also be on the MPO’s long range plan. Accepted
projects are then placed on the 6 year plan, after approval by TRAC.
The following officials are involved in the selection process: city and county officials,
transportation district officials, MPOs, and central office staff. The first three propose
projects, which are scored by the central office staff using the TRAC criteria. TRAC does
not identify projects. Once the applications are received TRAC prioritizes them based on
the criteria. TRAC then publishes the scores of the various projects in local newspapers.

Steps in the Project Selection Process
TRAC receives 50 to 75 applications for new capacity projects annually. Each proposed
project is assessed and given a numerical score from 0 to 130. The points are allocated to
the following TRAC criteria: transportation efficiency (55 points); safety (15 points);
economic development (30 points); public/private/local participation (15 points); unique
multimodal impacts (5 points) and urban revitalization (10 points).
Annually, TRAC holds six public hearings around the state beginning in August and
ending in October. A draft project list is published each December. Politicians can attend
the public hearings and voice their support for a specific project, but in the words of one
respondent: “Their support does not make a difference as to whether the project will be
selected” by the TRAC. In prioritizing projects there is said to be no legislative
involvement.
Funds are dedicated by the legislature but the legislature does not identify the projects to
be built. That is entirely up to the TRAC. The allocated funds go to the planning
department for disbursement to projects.
Funding tends to be distributed evenly (a third to each) among rural, urban, and suburban
areas. This is done through the weighing system in the TRAC criteria, primarily the
urban/rural macro corridor.
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Political Influence in Project Selection
TRAC was created to remove political influence on project decision-making. All the
respondents said it was a successful reform in this regard. The Director of the Ohio DOT
is the chairperson of TRAC. This is described as producing a better relationship with
more understanding between TRAC and the ODOT. TRAC is said to improve ODOT
performance by bringing about an open, visible process to project decision-making.
TRAC, the interviewees stated, has changed the dynamics of project selection. “Before
TRAC citizen groups would lobby directly to ODOT. But ODOT did not have any
criteria for ranking or deciding which projects had merit.” In addition, before TRAC,
gubernatorial candidates used to make promises to build new transportation facilities.
Now they are much less likely to, since they know that TRAC selects the projects. This
too has reduced the role of politics in project selection. “Political officials (legislators,
governors) cannot make promises about new roads/bridges. Every thing is visible.
Sponsors can see the score, costs, etc. for their project and other projects. Previously,
project decision making was done in a vacuum. The perception was that those who
scream the loudest or have the best political connections will get their projects funded.”
Legislators are said to like the current system because they are no longer expected to
bring projects home for their districts.
By reducing political involvement, TRAC also reduced waste in the ODOT labor force.
“Before TRAC, there were three or four times the number of projects in the ODOT
pipeline. TRAC brought a more realistic number of projects and a process that is more
objective. ODOT is no longer wasting resources on projects that will not be built.”
ODOT now consistently builds the projects it says it will build. The result, respondents
said, is that the number of ODOT employees has dropped from more than 8,000 to less
than 6,000, without a large increase in contracting out.

Greater Local Involvement
TRAC is successful in other respects. It has reduced overspending and encouraged local
governments to assume some of the costs of projects. One of the criteria for scoring a
project is local contribution of funds. “This requirement has brought about greater levels
of local money for capacity improvement projects.”
TRAC imposes funding caps or ceilings on projects and can refuse to authorize additional
funds when a project goes over budget. When local projects go above cost, the district or
local officials must come before TRAC and request additional funds. This forces districts
to be more honest with their cost estimates when they proposed new projects. The TRAC
does not automatically approve additional funds for projects that are more than 10% over
budget.
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The scoring system is said to also produce a better balance between rural and urban
projects. It is also said to better reflect the population distribution of the state between
urban, rural and suburban areas.

A.4.4 Financial Management and Funding Commitments
Ohio’s system puts maintenance ahead of new capacity projects. Of the funds that are
allocated, some are used for capacity projects and some for resurfacing and preventive
maintenance. “If there is not enough money allocated for the year, then there will not be
any capacity projects, as there were not for the last two years. However, there was money
for preservation for the districts.” However, funding for capacity expansion is
predictable and underfunding does not occur, because projects are not put on the capital
improvement list, if funds are not available.
The approval of the transportation budget follows the same steps and procedures as the
approval of the general fund. Financial capacity to fund long term needs begins with a
revenue forecast. ODOT then determines what the districts need to finance preservation
and maintenance needs. If there are funds left after preservation needs are met, then those
dollars go to TRAC for capital improvement projects. The ODOT finance department
sets the budget for ODOT (the central and district offices) based on their allocation from
the legislature. TRAC, itself, has no financial responsibilities beyond balancing its
budget. TRAC has no input as to the size of its budget. As noted above, TRAC’s budget
is based on the amount of money left after the preservation needs are met. When a project
that TRAC has approved is underfunded then it is deferred to the next year. Upon hearing
how much money is available for new projects, TRAC assigns funds to projects.
Currently, they have $500 million for projects.
Only a small amount of funding comes from debt. The debt limit for road fund supported
bond issues is 20%. Currently, Ohio is at 11%. The state has no revenue bonds or
GARVEE bonds. The state also has a policy not to dedicate more than 10% of federal
funds for debt service. Today they are at 9.9%.

A.4.5 Other Structural Features that Affect Performance
According to respondents, TRAC has contributed to some other changes that have made
ODOT more effective. People are said to be better at their jobs, because positions are
more analytical than clerical. They are using computers to monitor the performance of the
12 districts. TRAC makes it easier to see which jobs they do well and those they don’t, so
that the latter can be contracted out. They no longer hire and train for all jobs, only those
they do well. The reforms also improved the attitude of the remaining employees. “Those
employees who were left were much more excited and energetic about their jobs. This
energy helped ODOT receive the most improved department in state government for six
or seven years. People were happy to come to work and proud of where they worked after
the organizational change.”
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A.4.6 Best Practices
Ohio appears to have a well-thought out and comprehensive system for project selection
and prioritization— with a number of built-in accountability mechanisms. It divides
system preservation and maintenance from system capacity expansion by having the
Transportation Review Advisory Council (TRAC) select and prioritize the major new
projects, while the districts are responsible for selecting the maintenance and preservation
projects. System preservation is given funding priority, as TRAC is funded after the
districts have been allocated sufficient funds to maintain the state highway system.

Integrating Local Needs and Goals into Decision Making
The districts are held accountable by the creation of performance goals for their road
systems. They are expected to achieve satisfactory performance on various quantitative
indicators (e.g., highway condition as measured by IRI). District officials choose the
specific maintenance projects in their district most likely to meet the goals. The central
office, for its part, gathers information on progress in each of the districts and holds
weekly meetings to ensure attainment of performance standards. In sum, under the 1994
reform, the districts are allocated resources and can spend those resources as they see fit,
so long as performance goals are met.
TRAC selects the new capacity enhancing projects based on a set of criteria that take
local needs into account. In addition, local officials can propose projects, but they do not
score the projects, a task performed by the central office that has the requisite expertise.
As a result, new highway capacity project selection is much more objective. TRAC is
authorized to make the final selections based on the scoring.
Local governments are encouraged to share the costs of projects and must contribute
more local money when projects go over the estimated cost. They do not automatically
get money from the central office when overruns occur.

Enhancing Accountability and Credibility
The respondents indicated that the new system improved accountability and produced a
number of desirable results. ODOT now spends less time designing projects that will not
be built and has 1800 fewer employees. The condition of the roads has improved. Politics
has been removed from the system, as the politicians and their constituents accept the
decisions of TRAC. Governors and legislators no longer make transportation promises
now that TRAC, not the politicians, chooses the projects to be built. With less waste there
is more money to fund new capacity projects. Taken together, the new system has
increased public esteem for ODOT.
TRAC has generated more trust in ODOT on the part of the public and legislators. As an
independent body, TRAC makes ODOT look more credible in its activities and project
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selection. This was attributed to the criteria based selection process more than TRAC’s
relative independence. In addition, TRAC is said to give ODOT stability and clout with
the legislature, because the public knows that it is delivering on its promises. The rise in
trust was said to have made it possible for ODOT to ask for and receive an increase in the
gas tax. Another sign of trust is a decline in complaints of unfairness in project selection.
In the beginning there were complaints, but the public has grown to accept TRAC’s
decisions.
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A.5 Washington State Case Study
Case Study Highlights
 The various roles and responsibilities for some key state transportation functions were
in the process of being recast as this case study was being completed.
 The Washington Transportation Commission is a bipartisan independent commission
with seven citizen members that serves in a policy making and ‘boards of director’
capacity.
 Strengths of the commission: (1) serves as a public sounding board; (2) acts a conduit
for legislators to speak out; (3) tempered WSDOT’s decision making; (4) provided a
level of comfort for all parties; and (5) allowed for continuity and longevity to the
position of Secretary of Transportation. Weaknesses of the commission: (1) allows
for rubber stamping of WSDOT decisions without executive branch oversight; and
(2) commission had no independent staff analytical capability, but provided the
appearance of independence.
 In 2003 a “nickel gas tax program” was passed by the legislature along with the
legislative evaluation accountability program. Failure to meet expectations set forth
in the Nickel Program has resulted in major changes in the governance of
transportation functions in the state.
 The Washington Transportation Commission provides a two-day public forum
monthly. The open meetings are held at various locations throughout the state and
the WSDOT has been held publicly accountable in these televised forums by the
bipartisan commission.

At the time this case study was conducted (August 2005), Washington was undergoing a
transition in how the function of state transportation was arranged. Prior to 2005, the
State of Washington had a bipartisan independent transportation commission with seven
citizen members appointed by the governor and confirmed by the Senate. The
commission had responsibility for appointing the Secretary of Transportation beginning
when that new agency was created in 1977. The commission’s other responsibilities
included preparing the state’s long range transportation plan, proposing the state’s
transportation budget, working with others to formulate transportation policy, and
overseeing the implementation of policy and operational plans for highways, ferries, and
intercity passenger rail. The various roles and responsibilities for some key state
transportation functions were in the process of being recast as this case study was being
completed. The major changes and their rationales are described in the discussion that
follows

A.5.1 Washington State Department of Transportation (WSDOT)
The Washington State Department of Transportation (WSDOT) was created in 1977 and
is headed by the Secretary of Transportation. The 1977 legislature vested the department
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with the responsibility for developing and maintaining a comprehensive and balanced
statewide transportation system.
WSDOT is organized into 6 geographical regions and the Urban Corridors Officers,
several modal divisions, and statewide oversight through the central headquarters office.
The organizational chart for WSDOT is presented in Figure A.5.1.
Prior to 2005, the Secretary of Transportation was appointed by the Washington
Transportation Commission, which also served in a policymaking and board of directors
capacity for the WSDOT. Effective July 2005, however, WSDOT became a Cabinet
Agency, with the Secretary of Transportation becoming a Cabinet Secretary, appointed
by and serving at the pleasure of the Governor.
Figure A.5.1: WSDOT Organizational Chart

Source: WSDOT Website (http://www.wsdot.wa.gov/about/ExecOrgChart.htm)

The most significant change in structure for the WSDOT in recent years has been the
establishment of six regional offices which are capable of dealing with project
development (some including mega bridge projects) in their areas and an “urban
corridor” division.
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It should be further noted that they have had only four secretaries in 28 years. The
WSDOT recognizes that the commission structure with this past appointment authority
has provided that stability.

A.5.2 Washington Transportation Commission
Background
The Washington Transportation Commission, a bipartisan independent commission with
seven citizen members, was established in 1951. It was not until the 1977 creation of the
WSDOT out of the “Highway Board” was the commission given authority to choose the
WSDOT Secretary as it had previously chosen the Directors of the Highway Board. Its
legislative preamble stressed that, given the long-term nature of transportation
investments, programs/projects should not be subject to the shorter term political whims.
In essence, longer term transportation leadership was needed, and the selection of
Transportation Secretary by the commission provided for continuity of WSDOT
leadership.

Primary Functions of the Commission
In the past, the Transportation Commission had responsibility for preparing the 20-year
transportation plan, reviewing and approving the department’s budget and investment
plan, and oversight of the department. The WSDOT received a broad program
appropriation that included its ‘reference list of projects’ from the legislature. The
commission had the ability to authorize changes and shift money from those lagging
projects to those that were ready to move ahead. Clearly, controversies arose form time
to time when legislators perceived their projects as being ‘cut’ or not moving forward
quickly enough.
In 2003 a “nickel gas tax program” was passed by the legislature along with the
legislative evaluation accountability program. The passing of the nickel program was
premised on a definitive list of projects that would be built over a specific time period.
At his time the commission lost the wholesale authority to make changes to the nickel
list. While the legislature acknowledged the need for the Commission and/or the
WSDOT to be able to make some changes over time, the nickel list was held to a stricter
accountability guideline. Only under very specific circumstances was the commission
allowed to grant changes requested by the DOT and the legislature was to be kept
informed of these changes on a quarterly basis.
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Monthly Meetings
There are not many state functions/agencies in any state that the public can access
monthly to get a report of progress and have the opportunity to raise concerns. The
Washington Transportation Commission has provided a two-day forum monthly. The
open meetings are held at various locations throughout the state and the WSDOT has
been held publicly accountable in these televised forums by the bipartisan commission.

Recent Changes to the Commission’s Responsibility
In 2004, the Washington legislature passed a 9.5 cent gas tax increase and changed the
governance of transportation functions.
They divested the commission of the
responsibility of appointing the secretary of the DOT and the authority to approve the
DOT’s budget. The legislature also left with the commission the responsibility for the
20-year transportation plan and the shorter range investment plan. The Transportation
Commission also maintained the responsibility for setting transportation performance
benchmarks as well as the authority to set tolls and ferry fares. The Transportation
Performance Audit Board was moved from the auspices of the legislature to the
commission. Additional responsibilities were given to the commission that included a
biennial report on the state of transportation, a series of special studies and rule making
authority for a new public-private initiatives program. Finally, they kept the authority to
approve funding changes between projects and for bond authorizations.
The law that made the most recent changes contained a provision requiring the legislature
to conduct a study on transportation governance. While the governor vetoed this
provision, she did call for the Governor’s Office to bring all the parties to the table to
examine the statutory changes put in place and to determine whether realignment may be
needed in the future. The issues surrounding the roles of the commission, the DOT, the
legislature, and the executive branch in transportation have been hotly debated since the
1999/2000 report of the Blue Ribbon Commission on Transportation. The Blue Ribbon
Commission recommended that the governor appoint the WSDOT Secretary and that the
governor and the legislature have more control over transportation functions in the state.
Among the Blue Ribbon Commission’s other recommendations was for the state to
institute a series of benchmarks to guide future transportation development and measure
performance.

Commission Strengths and Weakness
The following are strengths and weaknesses of the past commission/department
arrangement as seen from the Washington Senate staff coordinator’s perspective:
Commission Strengths -• Public sounding board
• Conduit for legislators to speak out
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•
•
•

Tempered the DOT’s decision making
Bipartisan policy structure gave a level of comfort to everyone
Continuity and longevity to secretary’s position

Commission Weaknesses -• Rubber stamp of the DOT without executive branch oversight
• No independent staff analytical capability, but appearance of independence
• Legislators attempted to influence DOT at central office and/or regions
Table A.5.1 summarizes the key role/responsibility/relationship changes in transportation
governance and function as they stand in 2005 for the State of Washington (bold type
indicates a current 2005 function vs. the italics type for a previous function):

A.5.3 Project Selection Process
Projects in the Nickel Program
The current management of WSDOT used a relatively straight forward process of project
prioritization and selection for the roster of projects in the nickel program. Project
selection began with the regions conducting various needs analyses (including safety and
capacity) and project lists (with the accompanying descriptions/analyses) were then sent
to the central office to create a composite roster for review. The composite was
distributed to central office WSDOT senior professionals who were instructed to review
and array the projects (based on their added experience and knowledge) into A-B-C (with
the A listed projects being the highest priority) funding categories having approximately
equal funding requirements. The high correlation between the lists of the senior
professionals was “absolutely remarkable” according to the WSDOT secretary and even
more remarkable that the commission and the legislature saw the priorities the same way.
In the words of the secretary:
I believe good projects came forward… and that a lot of work from the staff in the
regions went into building the project evaluation and descriptive lists. Different
projects have different attributes… and we didn’t need complex scoring systems.
It’s a matter of good project information built up from the regions, professional
judgment based on experience and knowledge, and common sense as confirmed
by the commission and legislature. The dichotomy about projects being picked
purely politically vs. through a rational system of screening is useless since
neither of those polarities exist… it is a matter of where and how you import
value contributions into the process.
Both persons interviewed from the commission and the legislature brought up, without
prompting, how well this WSDOT initiated system of project prioritization and selection
worked for the nickel program.
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Table A.5.1: Changes in Roles and Responsibilities in Washington’s Transportation Governance
Transportation Commission
 Long-range transportation plan
(including investments)
 Appointment of the WSDOT secretary
 Audit and performance measures
 Capital (transportation) program
authorization and monitoring
 Capital program interim project
change approval and bond
authorizations
 Advise governor regarding
transportation investments
 Sets ferry rates, tolls and
benchmarks
 Biennial report on the state of
transportation
 Special studies (including rail) and
public-private initiatives program

WSDOT
 Reports to the commission
 Reports to the governor
 Agency budget is part of
executive budget
 Capital (transportation)
program and monitoring
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Governor
 Governor appoints
commission members
 Appoints the WSDOT
secretary
 WSDOT agency budget
part the executive budget

Legislature
 Capital program
authorization
 Audit and performance
measures
 Executive budget (with
WSDOT) authorization

A.5.4 Financial Management
When the current Secretary of Transportation arrived at the WSDOT in 2001, he found
the department using a confusing array of financial plans with a variety of time horizons.
Operating costs and capital (project) expenditures were commingled and bond proceeds
were shown as revenues. The latter produced what the Secretary referred to as “a bizarre
revenue trend line.” Over the intervening years a pro forma budget has been established
that has the acceptance of the commission and the legislature. This provides the
department and others with more useful information regarding the financial condition of
the department and status of the capital expenditure program. The ten-year capital plan is
based on a thorough analysis of needs that are bubbled-up from the regions. The process
includes regional WSDOT public input and has had the benefit of the commission
holding monthly public meetings around the state that are also televised on the state’s
public affairs TV network.

A.5.5 Other Structural Features that Affect Performance
Management Audits
With the legislative passage of the of the nickel gas tax and the programming of a
specific list projects came increased accountability and a series of management audits of
WSDOT conducted by the Transportation Performance Audit Board in conjunction with
the Joint Legislative Audit and Review Committee (JLARC). The Transportation
Performance Audit Board has been moved recently from the auspices of the legislature to
the commission. The management audits have included: environmental permitting and
practices; project construction management practices; and the supporting information
technology systems. The WSDOT acknowledges the usefulness of these audits and the
resulting improvement recommendations. A recent audit report (2004-5) was issued that
reviewed the critical path management, risk management, project reporting and
organizational structures used to execute capital projects (focusing on project delivery of
state transportation facilities) by the WSDOT. The JLARC employed a nationally
recognized engineering consulting firm to assist with example (case study) project
reviews. The report states a series of findings regarding WSDOT’s critical path
management, risk management, reporting and organization and also provides
management recommendations for WSDOT.

Project Management Tools and Program Management Information
While the JLARC audit praised some of the WSDOT project management efforts, they
recommended that they refine and extend their practices. Especially the use of the
WSDOT Project Delivery Information System and the project management software
tools including Primavera Project Planner for the Enterprise. The audit found that
projects that “utilized the advanced software tools yield superior critical path
management practices.” However, the according to the JLARC the current degree of
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local (regional) autonomy has precluded the universal adoption of “these strong
practices.”
In regard to program management information the picture is not as positive. According
to the WSDOT secretary, they need to keep up with scope, schedule and budget for all
the projects. They particularly need to be able to roll up the current expenditures and
projected cost to completion for all projects in the program to compare with projected
revenue availability. The WSDOT is often ask to explain the individual project over-runs
that adversely impact the total funding available for the program’s remaining projects.
This is particularly troublesome since the nickel program was sold on the expectation of
delivering specific projects that had definitive schedules and costs. The secretary
lamented the fact of project cost creep impacts especially in the current economy with
dramatically increased cost of oil, steel and cement. The WSDOT Secretary simply
stated: “the problem is bigger than our solutions.” He elaborated as follows:
(The two problems) are first, persuading and demonstrating to the legislature that
we… do good work and the second is the legislature and us persuading the public
that this system is functioning… but every time we go outside we realize that it is
a Mt. Everest we are trying to climb of public skepticism and trust of us
(WSDOT) and government in general…. (this) comes back to haunt us by their
voting against any taxes… against the incapability and incompetence of
government. We’ve done a lot of things right to turn that around, but not enough
– it’s a big problem.

A.5.6 Best Practices
It is clear that the structure of transportation governance has been a hotly-debated subject
in the State of Washington since 1999/2000. Particularly, the executive and legislative
branches of government in Washington were largely out of the loop of direct decision
making and accountability. Changes finally occurred with the advent of the Blue Ribbon
Commission and its recommendations for the WSDOT to be brought under the executive
branch and the desire of the legislature to represent the interests of their constituents in
the area of transportation. There is uncertainty about whether that the new mix of
responsibilities among the entities will work effectively or efficiently and this was
recognized by the call for a study on transportation governance to be conducted. Key
changes include the governor now appointing the secretary and the WSDOT preparing its
agency and capital project budget as part of the executive budget to be submitted directly
to the legislature. The commission maintains its responsibility for long-range
transportation planning and investment and is given new responsibility for benchmarking
and measuring performance for transportation. It remains to be seen how this new
governance structure will work, but it is clear that the independence of the commission
and WSDOT has been reduced. In the candid words of the senate staff coordinator – “In
the end the legislators might not realize what they have done.”
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Regardless of this recent shift of responsibilities, there are significant issues that will
affect the future of the WSDOT’s performance. While they may not be unique to the
State of Washington, they are part of the situation leading up to these changes and will
continue to impact efforts to improve transportation governance and transportation
program and project delivery. Three concerns are at the top of the list of the secretary:
public perception and trust; project management; and professional staff retention. The
first two issues were discussed previously. The professional staff retention issue seems to
be pervasive among DOTs and there have been few positive steps taken to address the
problem anywhere including the WSDOT.

WSDOT Project Selection
The bottom-up system previously discussed starting with a detailed project
analysis/evaluation (including safety and capacity factors) initiated in the region;
followed by overall prioritization based on the professional judgment (combining
experience and knowledge) of the central office; and concluding with review and
common sense adjustment by the commission and the legislature has proved reliable and
acceptable.

Commission Public Outreach and WSDOT Accountability
The two-day monthly meetings of the commission held in various locations throughout
the state are unique. These sessions, open to the public and televised by the state’s public
service network, provide a highly visible public forum. At these sessions the WSDOT is
held accountable for program performance and project delivery.

TPAB/JLARC Review/Audit
There is a significant and growing emphasis on benchmarking performance and
reviewing and auditing the processes and procedures of the WSDOT. The usefulness of
the audits/reviews has been clearly recognized by the DOT. A sampling of the program
management audit results were noted previously. The commission (and previously the
legislature) through the Transportation Performance Audit Board has the responsibility
for performance auditing.
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Appendix B: Case Study Interviewees
For each case study visit, our goal was to interview the following:
(1) DOT Director or his/her Chief of Staff
(2) Commission member and/or staff person
(3) Senior staff member of the Legislative Transportation Committee
(4) Chief or Deputy Chief Engineer or Senior Highway Engineer
(5) Senior DOT official involved in project selection and/or planning
(6) Senior DOT official responsible for budgeting and finance
(7) Representative of the State Budget Office
The actual interviewees for each case study visit are detailed below:

Florida
(1) Dave Lee & Dick Glaze, Intermodal System Development
(2) Kevin Thiebault, Assistant Secretary for Engineering and Operations
(3) Howard Glassman, Executive Director of the Florida Metropolitan Planning
Organization Advisory Council
(4) Reynold Meyer, Staff Director of the Senate Committee on Transportation
(5) Kurt Eichin, Legislative Analyst, Florida Senate, Transportation Committee
(6) Laura Kelley, Executive Director of the Florida Transportation Commission
(7) Mark Reichert, Senior Analyst, Florida Transportation Commission
(8) Sally Patrenos, Assistant Executive Director of the Florida Transportation
Commission
(9) Lowell Clary, Assistant Secretary for Finance and Administration

119

Maryland
(1) Joseph Miklochik, State Roads Commission
(2) Dennis Yoder, Assistant Division Chief, Regional and Intermodal Planning
(3) Mary Deitz, Assistant Division Chief, Regional and Intermodal Planning
(4) Charles Martin, Senior State Engineer, Traffic and Safety
(5) Peter Stephanos, Director, Materials and Technology
(6) Ed Strocko, Planning Division
(7) Missy Cassidy, Director, Policy and Governmental Affairs

Minnesota
(1) Al Schenkelberg, Director, Transportation Office of Investment Management
(2) Norm Foster, Executive Budget Director
(3) Robert Winter, Director, District Operations Division
(4) John Walz, Fiscal Analyst, House Transportation Finance Committee
(5) Randy Halvorson, Director, Program Management Division
(6) Amy Vennewitz, Fiscal Analyst, Minnesota Senate
(7) Charles Kettering, Economic Policy Analyst
(8) Michael Hagerty, Transportation Budget Director
(9) Doug Differt, Deputy Commissioner of Transportation

Ohio
(1) Andrew I. Gall, Chief of Staff
(2) Carla C. Cefaratti, Deputy Director for Local Programs
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(3) Tim S. McDonald, Deputy Director, Division of Production Management
(4) Michelle Holdgreve, Deputy Director, Legislative Services
(5) Howard P. Wood, Deputy Director, Division of Planning
(6) Cash Misel, Assistant Director, Planning and Production & Chief Engineer
(7) Julie Ray, Deputy Director, Finance and Accounting

Washington
(1) Doug MacDonald, Secretary of Transportation
(2) John Conrad, Chief Engineer
(3) Jennifer Ziegler, Administrator (former), Washington Transportation Commission
(4) Reema Griffith, Administrator, Washington Transportation Commission
(5) Mike Groesch, Staff Coordinator, Transportation Committee of the Washington
Senate
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Appendix C: Case Study Survey Interview Questions
Introduction
We are conducting research to identify best practices for the planning of
transportation projects—including project identification, prioritization and project
selection.
We know that project planning can be a complex process in which many people
from different areas of government must participate. Therefore we are talking to
representatives of the DOT, the legislature, the governor’s office, the transportation
commission or board, and the budget office.

The Planning Process and Your Role in It
1. What is your current position?
2. How long have you worked in this position?
3. The next question concerns three aspects of the transportation planning process as
you understand them.
A. First, how do potential projects get identified?
B. Second, after being identified, how then do specific projects get placed on the
list of projects to be built?
C. Third, how and when are funds dedicated to them and by whom?
4. Which government officials and departments are involved in identifying and
prioritizing projects—for example which legislative committees, which DOT
departments, etc.?
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5. What does each of them do to move the planning and selection process along?
6. What role do you play in regard to transportation planning and project selection?
7. During the course of your duties which government officials do you consult with or
work with?
8. Concerning the overall process, would you say that there is an unofficial as well as
official process for identifying and prioritizing projects?
9. If yes, what distinguishes the unofficial from the official?

Possible Shortcomings with the Process
It is frequently asserted by many observers that there are flaws or shortcomings in
the transportation planning and prioritization process, flaws or shortcomings that lead to
the poor allocation of scarce transportation resources. In practice, this means that some
projects receive funds that they ought not to receive and, conversely, more worthy
projects are ignored or under funded.
1. What is your state doing to prevent flaws and shortcomings that can lead to
misallocation of transportation resources?
2. What additional safeguards or changes to the process might improve the planning and
prioritization process?
3. Why do you think these safeguards and changes have not been made?
4. Please describe a project that should have been selected but was not or a project that
was either over or under funded.
5. Why was this particular project not selected or, if selected, allocated either too much
or too little funding as the case may be?
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6. If a politician has a pet project that is not deemed worthy of placement on the priority
list and he wants to see it funded, what, if anything, can be done to prevent him from
getting a less worthy project on the priority list?
7. Which individual or organization in your state would be able to block such a pet
project?
8. How would they do it?

States with Transportation/ Highway Commissions
In our preliminary research, we have found a possible association between the
presence of a highway commission and improved DOT performance.
1. What is the overall role of your transportation review advisory council?
2. What role does the commission play in transportation planning?
3. Which parties in and out of government does the commission consult with in the
course of its work?
4. What do you think your transportation commission does that contributes to improved
performance?
5. What is the commission’s role in the identification and prioritization and selection of
projects to fund?
6. Please describe a case or situation in your state when the commission appears to have
contributed to a better outcome.
7. What would have been different if the commission had not acted as it did?
8. If the commission was abolished in what ways would the planning and prioritization
process change?
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9. Which, if any, changes would be a detriment and why?
10. Which, if any, changes would be an improvement and why?
11. What authority or powers does the commission possess to prevent a politician from
moving a pet project onto the priority list?

State without Commission – Minnesota
The 2000 Transportation Bill created a Major Transportation Projects
Commission. However, in the 2002-2003 session, this Commission was terminated and
your state does not currently have a commission.
1. Why did your state eliminate its commission?
2. Who now makes the decisions formally made by the commission?
3. How has this changed project planning and selection?
4. Is project planning and selection better or worse?
5. In what ways are things better or worse?

Other DOT Reforms and Practices
Many DOTs are currently revising their organizational practices. For example,
DOTs are increasingly turning to preventive maintenance to protect their investments in
transportation infrastructure. And many others are doing more contracting out for design
and other tasks once done in-house. Most have added a number of new IT systems..
1. What has your DOT changed lately in regard to these and other activities?
2. Have these changes improved the DOT performance?
3. In what respects has performance changed?
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4. Has your DOT undergone any other changes or reorganizations?
5. Please describe them?
6. How have they changed the overall performance of the DOT.
7. Do you think that your state devotes sufficient resources to preventive maintenance?
8. Why do you think it is or is not spending enough?
9. What changes might improve preventive maintenance?
10. Why do you think these change have not been made?

Financial Management
1. What is the relationship of your office to the central budget office?
2. Does approval of the transportation budget follow same steps and procedures as the
approval of the general fund?
3. If not, how are they different?
4. How do you determine your financial capacity to fund long term needs?
5. Who do you consult with to assess your financial capacity?
6. Do you discuss finances with the commission?
7. What is their role in financial management of DOT?
8. If the long term plan is underfunded, what do you do?
9. If its determined that additional funds are need to meet the long term plan, please
describe the roles of the secretary, the governor, the commission?
10. What portion of the current long term plan is financed by current revenue versus debt
financing?
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11. Do you have a debt limit for road fund supported or transportation related bond
issues?
12. What is it and who established it?
13. How determine how much debt you can take on?
14. What changes in financing would improve the system of funding highway project?
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